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STRENGTHENING AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE: 
REESTABLISHING AUDITS AS CONTROL AND 
PREMIUM SIGNALING MECHANISMS 
Sean M. O’Connor∗ 
Abstract: As recent scandals have demonstrated, ensuring the independence of auditors 
from the publicly traded clients whose books they inspect is one of the most vexing problems 
in the financial world today. Arguably, the imposition of a mandatory audit system through 
the 1930s federal securities laws created the modern problem of auditor independence. The 
core issue is that the statutory audit is simply a commodified cost of doing business for 
issuers that imposes an impossible obligation to serve an unspecified “investing public” on 
the auditors. Yet, this investing public neither hires, fires, nor controls the auditors. Instead, 
the audit relationship is managed by the board of the company being audited. The resultant 
conflict of interest has proven to be insurmountable even after multiple reform efforts. The 
conceptual solution is to both “decommodify” the audit and place control of it squarely in the 
hands of shareholders. To achieve this, the author proposes a tripartite remedy: first, the SEC 
should retire its “statutory audit” rules under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act (while 
retaining the public offering audit requirements of the 1933 Securities Act) in favor of 
market-driven private audits; second, state corporations law or federal securities law should 
be altered to give an express audit right to shareholders that they would exclusively control, 
with expenses reimbursed by the company; and third, the licensing and regulation of CPAs 
must be strengthened and either harmonized or unified. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Auditors must be independent from the individuals whom, or 
businesses which, they have been hired to audit. This may not be self-
evident at first glance, but it becomes axiomatic when one considers that 
the long history of audits—reaching across feudal, municipal, and 
business precedents—is based on the simple notion that a 
master/principal needs a highly trusted agent on whom she can rely to 
verify the activities of her other servants/agents.1 An auditor who is 
dependent in some way on these other servants/agents would intuitively 
seem to be more susceptible to corruption by the latter than an auditor 
who is fully independent of them. This simple concept is the heart of the 
surprisingly complicated issue of “auditor independence” that has been a 
major focal point of reform efforts, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 (“SOX”),2 which seek to prevent the next wave of corporate 
accounting scandals. 
                                                     
1. Sean M. O’Connor, Be Careful What You Wish For: How Accountants and Congress Created 
the Problem of Auditor Independence, 45 B.C. L. REV. 741, 756–58 (2004). 
2. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of Titles 11, 15, 18, 
28, and 29 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 2006)).  
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As I have argued elsewhere, the problem of auditor independence was 
created by the imposition of a mandatory audit system under the 1930s 
federal securities laws.3 The laws’ drafters erred in adopting certain 
portions of the British Companies Act, 1929 out of context. The 
Companies Act, 1929 was a comprehensive set of provisions for 
corporate, securities, and business bankruptcy laws in the United 
Kingdom that had no analogue in U.S. state or federal law.4 In addition, 
the accounting profession at the time was less well organized and 
regulated.5 Unlike the accountants in the United Kingdom, accountants 
in the United States had relatively low professional status and were not 
chartered by the government.6 
For several reasons, many accountants advocated for the new 
mandatory audit system in the U.S. federal securities laws. They hoped 
that the system would elevate their profession to the status of other 
learned professions such as law or medicine.7 These accountants and 
others also supported the mandatory audit system because it seemed to 
be an important feature of the highly regarded “British system,” as 
codified in the Companies Act, 1929.8 Finally, because the British audits 
were usually performed by highly prestigious “chartered accountants,” 
the U.S. accountants hoped to cement in the public’s mind that U.S. 
certified public accountants (CPAs) were every bit the equal of U.K. 
chartered accountants.9 
In seeking this prestigious government franchise, however, the 
accounting profession got more than it bargained for. It traded what had 
been a fairly lucrative premium service of supplying privately contracted 
audits for the new mandatory audits. Over time, such audits became a 
low-margin service perceived by clients as merely a commodified “cost 
of doing business” such as other regulatory costs and taxes that the 
government imposed on businesses.10 At the same time, accountants who 
took on these new mandatory audits also took on the impossible 
                                                     
3. See generally O’Connor, supra note 1. 
4. See id. at 781, 823; Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23; JOEL SELIGMAN, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 46–63 (3d ed., Aspen Publishers 2003) (1982). 
5. See O’Connor, supra note 1, at 751–55, 775–78. 
6. See id. 
7. See id. 
8. See id. at 790–91, 799–809. 
9. See id. at 751–55, 775–78. 
10. See infra Part I. 
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obligation of working as part of the public trust for an unspecified 
“investing public.”11 The resultant conflict of interest has proven to be 
insurmountable even after multiple reform efforts.12  
Part I of this Article begins with a brief review of the historical roots 
of the auditor independence issue13 and outlines the process that, in 
effect, commodified the statutory audit. Part II discusses the subsequent 
growth and consolidation of the accounting profession which led to a 
bramble bush of different auditor independence rule systems. Part III 
proposes a tripartite solution to reduce the problems of auditor 
independence by reestablishing the audit as a premium signaling 
mechanism for firms and as a control mechanism for the firms’ 
shareholders. 
I. THE CREATION OF A NEED FOR INDEPENDENCE: 
COMMODIFICATION OF THE AUDIT 
The roots of the modern problem of auditor independence can be 
traced back to the passage of the federal securities laws in the 1930s. 
This Part first summarizes historical research I have written about 
elsewhere.14 It then explicates the concept of “commodifying” the 
statutory audit. 
A. Origins of Auditor Independence 
The following exchange occurred between Colonel Arthur H. Carter 
and Senator Thomas P. Gore during Senate hearings on the Securities 
Act of 193315 (‘33 Act): 
Mr. CARTER. My experience would be that the average 
company pays around $500 or $600 or $700 for its auditing, that 
is, taking the large and small together. 
Senator GORE. How often do they resort to that? 
Mr. CARTER. Every year. And the largest organizations of our 
country do it and have been doing it for the last 15 years. 
. . . . 
                                                     
11. See infra Parts II, III.A. 
12. See infra Part III.A. 
13. A more in-depth treatment of this topic is set forth in O’Connor, supra note 1. 
14. See generally id. 
15. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2000)). 
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Senator GORE. But they have not been available for any public 
authority to examine and afford no safeguards? 
Mr. CARTER. They have been published in their annual reports 
and distributed to all of their stockholders, to the newspapers 
and anyone who calls for them. 
Senator GORE. And have not done any good? 
Mr. CARTER. Yes, sir; I think they have. 
Senator GORE. We have had all this debacle here in spite of 
that. 
Mr. CARTER. You still have some very sound companies and 
industries in this country.16 
Colonel Carter, a CPA and the President of the New York State 
Society of Certified Public Accountants, had taken it upon himself to 
advocate for the inclusion of a mandatory audit provision in the ‘33 
Act.17 But interestingly, the annual auditing practice he spoke of was a 
voluntary “best practice” that was emerging particularly among New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) listed companies.18 Eighty-five percent of 
these listed companies were choosing to undergo an audit by an outside 
accounting firm whose report would then be made available to anyone in 
the public for the asking.19 Further, such use of audits had been 
developing for 15 years prior to these hearings—well before the Great 
Crash of 1929.20 
Yet, as Senator Gore pointed out, this practice seems to have done 
little to prevent the accounting scandals and deceitful behavior that was 
alleged to have played a major role in the Crash. Further, as Senator 
Duncan U. Fletcher noted: “Most of these people applying to be 
registered already have an independent audit. It is not necessary to put 
them in the law. That is their practice now; that is, they are supposed to 
have already.”21 To which Carter backpedaled a bit by responding: “I 
                                                     
16. Securities Act of 1933: Hearings on S. 875 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and 
Currency, 73rd Cong. (1933) (statement of Col. Arthur H. Carter), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 59–60 
(comp. by J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar, 1973) [hereinafter Carter Statement].  
17. O’Connor, supra note 1, at 800 (citing JOHN L. CAREY, THE RISE OF THE ACCOUNTING 
PROFESSION: FROM TECHNICIAN TO PROFESSIONAL, 1896–1936, at 184–85 (1969)). 
18. O’Connor, supra note 1, at 800, 806–07. 
19. Id. at 807. 
20. Id.  
21. O’Connor, supra note 1, at 807 (quoting Carter Statement, supra note 16, at 60). 
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think the trend has been decidedly in that direction in the past five years, 
and especially in the last three years, and I certainly think it is a 
safeguard that should not be discouraged.”22 Of course, there is a world 
of difference between not discouraging an activity and enshrining it in 
federal law. 
The audit provision codified as part of the ‘33 Act was a one-time 
certification of the financial statements that an issuer must submit to the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) (later changed to be submitted to the 
newly created Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the ‘34 Act)23) and in the prospectuses 
accompanying what would now be deemed a “public offering” of stock 
(what I am calling the “offering audit”).24 The historical record indicates 
that this offering audit requirement may have simply come along for the 
ride when a raft of provisions for registering securities was copied from 
the British Companies Act, 1929.25 This is unfortunate because, as the 
brief review of the history of the British general audit practice given 
below reveals, a rich and nuanced cultural practice gave weight and 
credibility to the company audits required under the Companies Act, 
1929.26 Simply importing the audit provisions from British to U.S. law 
could not magically bring along this rich cultural practice. This was 
especially true given the evidence that many unscrupulous individuals in 
the United States held themselves out as auditors or accountants but 
performed very shoddy audits.27 It should not be surprising then that the 
American public was a bit skeptical of the purpose and value of audits.28 
Further, the rich, widespread, and apparently well-understood role of 
the British auditor (in Britain) was actually based on the development of 
a different kind of audit that first appeared in earlier versions of the 
Companies Act in the mid-1800s. This “statutory annual audit” 
                                                     
22. Id.  
23. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm (2000)). 
24. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, sched. A, ¶ 25, 48 Stat. 74, 90 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 77aa, sched. A, ¶ 25 (2000)). The notion of a “public offering” is not well defined in the 
’33 Act itself, even though it was intended to be a central concept in the new securities regulation 
system established by that law. See generally James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the 
Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 30 (1959).  
25. See O’Connor, supra note 1, at 809–17. 
26. O’Connor, supra note 1, at 773. 
27. Id. at 783 (citing JOHN L. CAREY, THE RISE OF THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION: FROM 
TECHNICIAN TO PROFESSIONAL, 1896–1936, at 83–84 (1969)).  
28. See JOHN L. CAREY, THE RISE OF THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION: FROM TECHNICIAN TO 
PROFESSIONAL, 1896–1936, at 76, 83–84 (1969). 
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provision required that an annual audit be performed by auditors, at least 
one of whom was appointed directly by the shareholders.29 However, 
based on longstanding British auditing tradition, there was no 
requirement that these auditors be accountants.30 Rather, “auditors” were 
simply trusted agents of a principal who would literally listen to the 
account reports of other agents of that principal in order to help the 
principal detect cheating or inappropriate use of the principal’s assets.31 
In the Companies Act, 1929, the auditor was the agent of the 
shareholders collectively and, in some earlier versions of the Companies 
Act, at least one of the auditors must be a shareholder himself.32 
However, the auditors were allowed to hire accountants to help them if 
so desired.33 
At the same time, the Companies Act, 1929 provided a single statute 
for laws regarding nearly all aspects of corporations in Britain—it 
included the corporations, securities, and bankruptcy laws that would 
develop separately in the United States.34 It was not until 1928, when the 
Companies Act had been substantially revised from an earlier version, 
that the new “prospectus audit” was added.35 This differed markedly 
from the existing statutory annual audit in that the prospectus audit was 
expressly for the purpose of certifying economic information to be put 
out into the markets for prospective investors to use when considering 
whether to invest in the company.36 The statutory annual audit, on the 
other hand, was primarily a mechanism to verify financial and 
management information to existing shareholders at the annual meeting 
so that the shareholders could exercise their significant governance 
                                                     
29. O’Connor, supra note 1, at 758. 
30. Id. at 758–59. 
31. Id. at 757–58. 
32. Id. at 758–73.  
33. Id. 
34. See id. at 749, 773.  
35. The prospectus audit required an auditor’s report on the profits of the company for the 
preceding three years as well as the rates of dividends, if any, paid on each class of stock in each of 
the three covered years. O’Connor, supra note 1, at 769. 
36. Shann Turnbull, How Audit Practices Got Muddled in the US and UK 4, 7 (May 1, 2005) 
(working paper delivered at the 10th Annual Meeting of the Financial Management Association, 
Bocconi University, Milan, Italy), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=717021#PaperDownload; see also Tim Bush, ‘Divided by Common Language,’ Where Economics 
Meets the Law: US versus Non-US Financial Reporting Models, INST. OF CHARTED ACCTS. IN ENG. 
AND WALES, June, 2005, at 6–9, http://www.icaew.co.uk/index.cfm?route=115933. 
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rights, including the right to remove all or some of the directors.37 Thus, 
as some commentators summarize it, the statutory annual audit serves a 
governance function, while the prospectus audit serves an economic 
information function.38 Other commentators categorize the statutory 
annual audit as a “stewardship audit” and the prospectus audit as a 
“transparency audit.”39 
By the time the ‘33 Act was drafted and passed in the United States, 
the statutory annual audit in the Companies Act, 1929 was tied to 
another provision that required the shareholders to elect an auditor—
either one of their own number or an outsider—each year to perform that 
audit.40 While this auditor was formally an officer of the company, he 
was beholden only to the shareholders who had appointed him, and who 
could then call for the company to pay his fees.41 His report was 
primarily for their eyes, although it could be made available to others.42 
But this audit did not have to be executed pursuant to a duty to any one 
other than the shareholders.43 At the same time, the auditor had access to 
company records and could interview other officers on demand.44 The 
prospectus audit was not as clearly tied to what I will call the 
shareholder auditor, although it may be that companies used the 
shareholder auditor for the prospectus audit as well. Finally, both the 
statutory annual audit and the prospectus audit must be distinguished 
from “internal audits” that management might choose to perform 
through either inside or outside auditors. In that case, the auditor would 
                                                     
37.  Shann Turnbull, How Audit Practices Got Muddled in the US and UK 4, 7 (May 1, 2005) 
(working paper delivered at the 10th Annual Meeting of the Financial Management Association, 
Bocconi University, Milan, Italy), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=717021#PaperDownload; see also Tim Bush, ‘Divided by Common Language,’ Where Economics 
Meets the Law: US versus Non-US Financial Reporting Models, INST. OF CHARTED ACCTS. IN ENG. 
AND WALES, June, 2005, at 6–9, http://www.icaew.co.uk/index.cfm?route=115933. 
38.  Shann Turnbull, How Audit Practices Got Muddled in the US and UK 4, 7 (May 1, 2005) 
(working paper delivered at the 10th Annual Meeting of the Financial Management Association, 
Bocconi University, Milan, Italy), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=717021#PaperDownload; see also Tim Bush, ‘Divided by Common Language,’ Where Economics 
Meets the Law: US versus Non-US Financial Reporting Models, INST. OF CHARTED ACCTS. IN ENG. 
AND WALES, June 2005, at 6–9, http://www.icaew.co.uk/index.cfm?route=115933. 
39. John A. Hepp & Brian W. Mayhew, Audits of Public Companies 3–4 (2004) (working paper, 
on file with author). 
40. O’Connor, supra note 1, at 765–71. 
41. Id. at 765–71, 774. 
   42.  Id. at 774.     
   43.  Id.   
44. Id. at 766. 
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consider management to be the client and the audit would primarily be 
intended for management. 
In the United States, incorporation and primary corporate governance 
had been left to the states.45 Inspired by Louis Brandeis’ Other People’s 
Money and How the Bankers Use It,46 as well as the larger Progressive 
Movement of the 1910s, President Roosevelt hoped to “federalize” U.S. 
corporate and securities law.47 Fearing constitutional challenges, the 
drafters of the federal securities laws grounded the ‘33 Act on the 
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution by limiting it to securities 
transactions involving the “instrumentalities of interstate commerce.”48 
Ultimately, the Roosevelt Administration did not attempt to introduce 
legislation to federalize corporations law and governance both because 
of a changing political climate and a lingering suspicion that it would be 
unconstitutional to do so.49 This left the United States with an 
uncomfortable hybrid system of laws concerning corporations. It also 
meant that the drafters of the ‘33 Act could not have included a global 
requirement for a company auditor elected by the shareholders as in the 
British model even if they had so desired. The critical question of who 
would control the audit relationship remained unanswered. In other 
words, who would have the power to hire and fire the auditors? The 
audit provision of the ‘33 Act merely stated that the required financial 
statements for registration had to be certified by an independent public 
or certified accountant. 
A second shortcoming of the partial adoption of the Companies Act, 
1929 into the ‘33 Act was that it underestimated the strength and 
credibility of the chartered accountant system in the United Kingdom. 
By the late 1800s, the U.K. accounting profession had been formally 
organized under a royal charter system.50 This system collected 
examination, licensing, and regulation functions under two 
geographically oriented chartered organizations: the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS) and the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) for their respective 
                                                     
45. O’Connor, supra note 1, at 775–76. 
46. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT (Bedford 
Books of St. Martin’s Press 1995) (1914). 
47. O’Connor, supra note 1, at 790, 793–94, 796–98. 
48. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 73–22, § 5, 48 Stat. 74 (1933); see also SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 45–
60. 
49. SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 45–60, 73–100. 
50. O’Connor, supra note 1, at 751–52. 
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eponymous territories.51 Contrast this with the situation in the United 
States where examination requirements for those wishing to use the new 
title of “CPA” did not even begin until the 1900s, after which a number 
of states took a decade or so to pass such laws.52 
Even if the drafters of the ‘33 Act had consciously wanted to emulate 
all of these aspects of the prospectus audit from the Companies Act, 
1929,53 the differences between the two countries’ legal systems may 
have prevented this. First, it likely would not have seemed possible to 
pre-empt state corporations laws to add either a new officer to 
corporations or a new shareholder right to elect an auditor. At best, this 
could only have been an extra federal requirement for companies who 
wished to register shares for a public offering under the ‘33 Act. Second, 
there was no single group of licensed professionals who could be called 
upon to provide audits under uniform standards and regulations. 
Instead, the final language of the ‘33 Act called for certification by an 
“independent public or certified accountant.”54 But at the same time, it 
contained no definition of either the phrase or its constituent elements. 
When is an accountant “independent”? How is a “public accountant” 
different from a “certified accountant”? And why not just use the 
accepted emerging title of “certified public accountant”? 
Intriguingly, the term “independent” was not part of the Companies 
Act, 1929.55 Except for the new prospectus audit in the British system,56 
auditors were always elected or hired by the party for whom they would 
be providing the audit service and who was the intended primary 
beneficiary of the audit.57 This was as true for the auditors who 
performed the statutory annual audit as it was for those who performed 
internal audits or investigative audits on behalf of creditors or the 
government.58 Thus, there was no need for “independence” in the British 
system, only standard remedies for fraud and breach of contract, and 
indeed there was no formal concept or requirement for “independence” 
in that system. In other words, auditors might allow themselves to be 
                                                     
   51. Id.  
52. Id. at 752–53. 
53. I have encountered no evidence that they did. 
54. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, sched. A, ¶ 25, 48 Stat. 74, 90 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 77aa, sched. A, ¶ 25 (2000)). 
55. O’Connor, supra note 1, at 809. 
   56. Id. at 769.   
57. Id. at 773–75. 
58. Id. 
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corrupted or bribed by the very individuals they were hired to monitor, 
but this constituted a general agency problem. Because neither British 
nor American law seem to have a concept or requirement for 
“independence” of agents generally, it is not clear why such a concept or 
requirement would be needed for auditors as agents. Instead, one might 
talk in terms of trying to elevate the auditor’s duties to his principal as 
those of the fiduciary (a standard term in agency law), but such a 
conception differs markedly from creating a new duty of 
“independence” in agency law.59 
Perhaps the drafters of the ‘33 Act were simply trying to find a way to 
designate that the auditor for the new offering audit should be an 
external auditor and not merely the internal accountant, auditor, or 
controller of the company. Or perhaps they really did mean 
“independent” in the way that term has evolved for accountants/auditors: 
an auditor with dual allegiance to both a party who controls the audit 
engagement and third party beneficiaries, where the auditor must then 
somehow exercise “independent” judgment apart from the desires of 
either party. We may never know the exact reasons for including this 
troublesome term in the ‘33 Act, but we do know that it resulted in the 
creation of a bramble bush of “auditor independence rules” by differing 
bodies with different levels of influence over auditors.60 
U.S. accountants seemed to welcome the legitimizing effect of the 
“independent public or certified accountant” language.61 Unlike their 
U.K. chartered accountant counterparts, U.S. accountants were often 
considered by business owners and investors to be “mere 
bookkeepers.”62 The royal imprimatur of a formal charter in no small 
way enhanced the prestige of the U.K. chartered accountants.63 Thus, a 
key theme of the nascent accounting profession in the United States 
during the late 1800s and early 1900s was a quest for recognition as a 
true profession—ideally, the equal of the medical and legal professions, 
                                                     
59. For earlier discussions of an agency model of the audit relationship and its relationship to 
auditor independence, see generally Rick Antle, Auditor Independence, 22 J. ACCT. RES. 1 (1984) 
and Rick Antle, The Auditor as an Economic Agent, 20 J. ACCT. RES. 503 (1982). 
60. See infra, Part II.B. 
61. O’Connor, supra note 1, at 820. However, U.S. accountants were decidedly unhappy about 
the potentially severe liability that came along with their new statutory role in securities offerings. 
Id. at 817–19. 
62. Id. at 776. 
63. Id. at 753–54. 
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but at least the peers of their U.K. chartered accountant brethren.64 This 
quest manifested itself in part by various segments of the profession 
seeking out weightier public service roles for themselves.65 One 
promising avenue for this was in the area of audits—which heretofore 
bore only a pale resemblance to the rich British audit tradition—such as 
those enshrined in the Companies Act, 1929.66  
In the United States, prior to the ‘33 Act, audits were simply a private 
engagement of an accountant or bookkeeper by an investor or manager 
to check up on the books of a debtor or subordinate.67 Such audits were 
largely akin to the category of “internal audits” mentioned above, except 
that some were investigative audits by external parties.68 The 
distinguishing feature of these audits, for purposes of this Article, was 
that there was direct privity between only the auditor and the primary 
beneficiary, who controlled the audit engagement (e.g., who had the full 
authority to hire, fire, and/or pay the auditor). Generally, there were no 
intended third party beneficiaries of these audits. Even in cases where 
the auditor and the client acknowledged some third party beneficiary 
(e.g., a bank or other creditor), there was no privity between the auditor 
and the third party beneficiary. Furthermore, no fixed legal requirements 
for audits existed, although some agencies were beginning to explore the 
use of audits in very particular instances.69 But in the first two decades 
of the twentieth century, some major corporations experimented with 
“public audits” that created large classes of third party beneficiaries—
public disclosures of private audits that they had commissioned for 
internal or shareholder purposes.70 This may have been an attempt to 
forestall government regulatory action with regard to complaints that the 
massive trusts and companies like U.S. Steel and the American Tobacco 
Company were misleading average investors. But whatever the actual 
impetus, the new public profile of audit work commissioned by these 
very companies proved a boon to the accounting profession. 
 
 
                                                     
64. Id. at 776–78. 
   65.  Id. at 783–95.  
66. Id. at 775–76. 
67. Id. at 754–55.  
   68. ARTHUR ANDERSEN & CO., A VISION OF GRANDEUR 18–20 (1988) [hereinafter VISION OF 
GRANDEUR] (history of Arthur Andersen & Co. published for the firm’s 75th anniversary).  
69. O’Connor, supra note 1, at 779. 
70. Id. at 778. 
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B. Commodification of the Audit 
 
This emerging best practice of “public audits” was then cited by 
Colonel Carter in his testimony at the Senate hearings for the ‘33 Act.71 
Accountants were advocating for this trend as a way to elevate their 
public reputation, along the lines of what today we might think of as a 
“Consumer Reports”-type entity.72 At the same time, many large 
corporations viewed public audits favorably as a prophylactic against 
unwelcome government regulation and/or a premium signaling device 
(or, more cynically, a marketing ploy) for the quality of their shares in 
the marketplace.73 
Left to its own devices, the trend toward public audits may well have 
led to a true reputational marketplace for auditors—one in which 
auditors essentially “rented” their reputations for objectivity and 
integrity to companies who were trying to raise money in the capital 
markets.74 Instead, the theory of reputational intermediaries was 
developed to explain the audit environment after the federal securities 
laws were passed, when the new mandatory audits displaced the 
voluntary public audits.75 But this theory, as applied to this later period, 
seems to have foundered on the record of actual history and behavior. 
One study found that reputational intermediaries such as auditors act in 
reputation depleting ways to a degree not predicted by the theory.76 
Other commentators suggest that it is unlikely that an efficient 
                                                     
71. See O’Connor, supra note 1, at 800–08 (citing Carter Statement, supra note 16, at 59–60).  
   72. Id. at 777–78, 800–09. The Consumer Reports analogy was introduced by Professor Gilson in 
his seminal article that established the idea of “reputational intermediaries” or “gatekeepers,” 
discussed infra, without actually using those terms. See generally Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation 
by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984). 
73. For a contemporary discussion of signaling theory, see HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. 
RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES–OXLEY DEBACLE: HOW TO FIX IT AND WHAT WE’VE LEARNED 28–30 
(2006).  
74. The literature surrounding the theory of reputational intermediaries and marketplaces is 
extensive. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal 
Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 888–98 (1984); see generally Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for 
Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 916 (1998); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About 
the Gatekeepers, Stupid”, 57 BUS. LAW. 1403 (2002); Gilson, supra note 72; Reinier H. Kraakman, 
Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986); 
Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability Regime, 
79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491 (2001). 
75. See O’Connor, supra note 1, at 787–88. 
76. See Brian W. Mayhew et al., The Effect of Accounting Uncertainty and Auditor Reputation on 
Auditor Objectivity, AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY, Sept. 2001, at 49–70. 
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marketplace for reputational intermediaries can exist in today’s highly 
concentrated market dominated by a small number of firms.77 
Yet through the 1920s, a fairly ideal environment for the development 
of a reputational marketplace existed. Nearly all the firms were still 
pure-play accounting/audit firms.78 The only substantial non-
accounting/audit service was a budding tax practice developed in the 
wake of the new federal tax legislation of the early 1900s.79 Companies 
apparently were beginning to believe that obtaining the “independent” 
certification of the company’s financial statements would give them an 
edge in the increasingly crowded equity markets of the Roaring 
Twenties.80 Even after the Great Crash, and perhaps because of it, the 
use of public audits increased.81 The NYSE began to require the 
certification of financial statements of all listed companies in 1932.82 
While this may have started the trend toward commodification of the 
public audit—by making it routine—it may also have simply been a way 
for the NYSE to signal its own “quality” in the marketplace for 
exchanges by having higher listing standards than competitors.83 
Arguably, so long as public audits were not legally required of all 
companies, this reputational marketplace for auditors would have 
continued to flourish in the same way that quality signaling markets 
seem to work today for selection of underwriters and even law firms. 
Nonetheless, with what might best be characterized as an insignificant 
decision overshadowed by more momentous considerations, the 
emerging best practice of voluntary public offering and annual audits 
was locked in place by its codification—at least as to initial offerings—
by the audit provisions of the ‘33 Act.84 While this codification did not 
                                                     
77. See Coffee, supra note 74, at 1413–15; Jonathan Macey & Hillary A. Sale, Observations on 
the Role of Commodification, Independence, and Governance in the Accounting Industry, 48 VILL. 
L. REV. 1167, 1176–82 (2003); Sean M. O’Connor, The Inevitability of Enron and the Impossibility 
of “Auditor Independence” Under the Current Audit System 64–67 (working paper), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=303181; Partnoy, supra note 74, at 491, 527. 
78. O’Connor, supra note 1, at 788. 
79. Id. at 783–85; VISION OF GRANDEUR, supra note 68, at 16–18. 
80. O’Connor, supra note 1, at 778, 806–07 (discussing auditor signaling experimentation by 
U.S. Steel and American Tobacco and quoting debate between Senator Gore and Colonel Carter 
about the efficacy of independent auditors). 
81. See id. at 790. 
82. See id. 
83. See, e.g., BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 73, at 33–34.   
84. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, sched. A, ¶ 25, 48 Stat. 74, 90 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 77aa, sched. A, ¶ 25 (2000)). 
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require all stock issuances to be accompanied by audited financials, it 
did require all issuances to the general public to be so accompanied.85 As 
a practical matter, then, this was essentially the same as requiring all 
stock issuances to have certified financials, at least from the general 
public’s point of view.86 
The focus of this Article so far has been on the audit provisions of the 
‘33 Act, yet far more important audit provisions would come in the ‘34 
Act. Such focus heretofore on the ‘33 Act is not misplaced because the 
‘33 Act audit provision set the model for the more far-reaching audit 
provisions of the ‘34 Act.87 At the same time, by 1934 much of the 
public’s furor over the stock market scandals and crash had dissipated, 
perhaps in part due to the passage of the ‘33 Act itself; so the ‘34 Act, 
including its audit provisions, was arguably not as strong of a reform law 
as the ‘33 Act.88 As discussed in Part I.A above, the ‘33 Act was only 
supposed to be the opening volley, on the part of the Roosevelt 
Administration, of a comprehensive set of laws designed to federalize 
corporate law. In the meantime, however, corporate and finance groups 
had a chance to regroup and begin extensive lobbying of their own.89 
Thus, in 1934, the Roosevelt Administration found itself defending the 
‘33 Act as much as promoting new legislation. Accordingly, the ‘34 Act 
became a compromise that softened many of the harshest civil liabilities 
and penalties of the ‘33 Act, while still providing for regulation of the 
exchanges, broker-dealers, and the secondary market in stock trading 
generally.90 
For purposes of this Article, the most salient part of the ‘34 Act is the 
establishment of ongoing periodic disclosure—or “reporting”—of 
                                                     
   85. Because Sections 3 and 4 of the ’33 Act provide exemptions to Section 5’s registration 
requirements for certain classes of securities or transactions in securities, not all stock issuances 
would need to comply with the audit requirements for registered offerings. See Securities Act of 
1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, §§ 3–5, 48 Stat. 74, 90 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c–77e (2000)).     
86. I am only making a definitional claim here: because general or public offerings need to follow 
the provisions of the ‘33 Act, investors seeking to buy stock in such an offering now would 
necessarily receive audited financials as part of the offering prospectus. Of course, members of the 
public can buy stock in private placements and other non-public, limited offerings, but, without 
rehashing the general principles of the federal securities laws here, suffice it to say that there are 
important limitations seeking to ensure adequate control and/or access to information for investors 
in such private/limited offerings. 
   87.  O’Connor, supra note 1, at 817–20. 
88.  Id.   
89. Id. at 819.  
90. Id. at 817–19. 
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publicly traded companies listed on a national exchange.91 But perhaps 
owing to the compromise nature of the ‘34 Act, or to the nascent trend to 
establish principles and guidelines in federal legislation rather than 
detailed rules, the disclosure provisions beyond the annual report 
requirement are grants of rulemaking authority to the new SEC.92 In 
particular, the decision whether to require auditor certification of any of 
these reports was delegated to the SEC.93 Instead of the “independent 
public or certified accountant” language of the ‘33 Act,94 however, the 
‘34 Act instead prescribed “independent public accountants”—if an 
audit was to be required at all (yet, like the ‘33 Act, it did not define the 
term).95 The SEC, of course, did choose to require that annual reports be 
certified, and also prescribed quarterly and material event reporting.96 
From hereon in, I will refer to the certification under the ‘33 Act as 
the “offering audit”97 and the ongoing certification of annual reports as 
the “statutory audit.” Note that neither of these is identical to the internal 
audit or external investigative audit. Note further that reporting 
companies are a subset of “issuers” under the ‘34 Act—the latter 
includes any companies that have issued securities in any form or venue 
regardless of whether the company has also sought to be listed on a 
national exchange and thus come under the reporting requirements of the 
‘34 Act.98 
When, in Schedule A of the ‘33 Act, Congress borrowed the 
prospectus audit from the Companies Act, 1929, this was appropriate at 
least at the functional level, despite the other flaws I have discussed 
above in Part I.A. This is so because both were aimed at delivering 
economic information to potential investors. But when the SEC issued 
                                                     
91. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 73 Pub. L. 291, §§ 12–13, 48 Stat. 881, 894–95 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l–78m (2000)). 
92. O’Connor, supra note 1, at 819. 
93. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 73 Pub. L. 291, § 13(a)(2), 48 Stat. 881, 894 (codified 
at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(2) (2000)) (stating that “[s]uch annual reports certified if required by the 
rules and regulations of the [SEC] by independent public accountants” (emphasis added)). 
  94. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, sched. A, ¶ 25, 48 Stat. 74, 90 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 77aa, sched. A, ¶ 25 (2000)). 
95. Id.; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 73 Pub. L. 291, § 13(a)(2), 48 Stat. 881, 894 (codified 
at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(2) (2000)). 
96. See Regulation 13A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1, -13 (2004). 
97. It could also be referred to as the “prospectus audit” as in the British tradition. See, e.g., 
Turnbull, supra note 36, at 4, 7; Bush, supra note 36, at 7–9. 
  98. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(8) (2000) (defining the term “issuers”); see, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 228.10(b)(3) 
(2005) (defining the term “reporting company”).  
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regulations requiring the statutory audit it seems to have failed to grasp 
the distinction between the Companies Act, 1929’s prospectus audits and 
statutory annual audits. Thus, the statutory audit promulgated under the 
‘34 Act differed critically in both form and function from the Companies 
Act, 1929’s statutory annual audit: as a matter of form, it failed to put 
the statutory audit exclusively in the hands of the shareholders; as a 
matter of function, it mandated only an economic information role for 
both existing and prospective investors. Of course, as discussed above, 
both the SEC and Congress believed they were constrained in what they 
could do as far as overriding state corporations law governance 
provisions. 
By default, under the ‘34 Act the SEC got to define who or what 
constituted an “independent public accountant” just as the FTC had 
given some guidance as to “independent public or certified accountants” 
in 1933 after the ‘33 Act was passed.99 The FTC deemed that 
accountants were not independent if they served as officers or directors 
of the company to be audited, or had a “substantial financial interest” in 
that company.100 The following year, the SEC added on to these early 
auditor independence rules by defining “substantial financial interest” as 
the equivalent of more than one percent of the auditor’s personal 
worth.101 The SEC later deleted the word “substantial” and prohibited 
any financial interest in the audit client.102 
Once the SEC exercised its authority regarding audits under the ’34 
Act, the potential business impact for accountants was realized: by law, 
every publicly traded company had to retain an outside audit firm to 
certify its annual reports. Congress and the accounting profession were 
clearly aware of the potential economic value to accountants—and 
expense to issuers—of even the offering audit established by the ‘33 
Act.103 But the ongoing annual statutory audit established by the SEC 
under the ‘34 Act was like the gift of an annuity to the profession.104  
                                                     
99. See PANEL ON AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS, REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ¶ 5.3 (Aug. 31, 
2000). 
100. See id. 
101. See id. at ¶ 5.3 n.4. 
102. Id. The further development of the SEC’s auditor independence rules is treated below. See 
infra Part II.  
103. O’Connor, supra note 1, at 800–07. 
104. The term “statutory audit” is a misnomer: technically it should be called the “regulatory 
audit.” But the term “statutory audit” has become the accepted one. 
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While it is trite to say that there is no free lunch, it is true that the 
statutory audit franchise given to the accounting profession did not come 
unencumbered. In particular, under both the offering audit and the 
statutory audit, the auditor took on legal liability for the opinions she 
gave as part of the certification.105 In fact, under the ‘33 Act as originally 
passed, this liability was so strict that it incensed leaders of the 
accounting profession.106 While the amendments to the ‘33 Act 
contained in the ‘34 Act, together with the relevant substantive portions 
of the ‘34 Act, reduced the full bite of this liability, it was not removed 
entirely.107 Nonetheless, the offering audit and statutory audit still 
provided the platform for an unforeseen dramatic expansion in the size 
and scope of accounting firms, as discussed in Part II below. 
Perhaps less obvious at the time, this coveted franchise turned the 
formerly voluntary public audit into a fungible or staple commodity.108 
For purposes of this Article, I will use the term “commodity” similar to 
the narrow manner that it is defined in the Commodities Exchange Act 
to include “all services, rights, and interests in which contracts for future 
delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.”109 This captures the 
operative essence of commodities in that they are fungible within their 
class such that none are individually valued other than by coarse metrics 
such as size or weight—e.g., one bushel of wheat is as good as another 
for commodities futures trading purposes. Once that objective, coarse 
metric is determined, sellers of commodities compete primarily on price. 
                                                     
105. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, § 11, 48 Stat. 74 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77a 
(2000)). 
106. O’Connor, supra note 1, at 817–19. 
107. Id.   
108. “Commodity” has different meanings in different contexts. In a broad legal definition, it 
simply denotes “movable articles of value.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 274 (6th ed., West 
Publishing 1991). In business law contexts it is defined as “[a]n article of trade or commerce” or “a 
raw material or an agricultural product.” A HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS LAW TERMS 123 (Bryan A. 
Garner, ed., West Group 1999). In the Commodities Exchange Act, “commodity” is defined as a 
specific list of enumerated items: 
The term “commodity” means wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, rye, flaxseed, grain 
sorghums, mill feeds, butter, eggs, Solanum tuberosum (Irish potatoes), wool, wool tops, fats 
and oils (including lard, tallow, cottonseed oil, peanut oil, soybean oil, and all other fats and 
oils), cottonseed meal, cottonseed, peanuts, soybeans, soybean meal, livestock, livestock 
products, and frozen concentrated orange juice, and all other goods and articles, except onions 
as provided in section 13–1 of this title, and all services, rights, and interests in which contracts 
for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in. 
7 U.S.C. § 1a(4) (2000). 
109. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(4) (2000). 
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The commodities trading markets, particularly the futures market, are 
dependent upon this being the case.110 I can commit to paying a certain 
price for a bushel of wheat in the future just based upon expectations of 
supply and demand in the markets, not upon whether a particular bushel 
will turn out to have special properties. Thus, the whole range of option 
puts, calls, swaps, and even short selling (where allowed) becomes 
available to traders. Shorting depends necessarily on fungibility: I expect 
that the price of wheat will decrease in the next month, so I borrow 
several bushels from someone else, promising to return them a month 
from now; I then sell the bushels tomorrow at the going market rate and 
pocket the money; finally, if all goes as planned, when it is time to return 
the bushels to my lender, I buy new bushels on the market at the lower 
prices a month from now and profit from the difference in what I sold 
his bushels for and what I had to pay to replace those bushels. 
Obviously, shorting does not work where lenders expect their actual 
bushels back (and can identify them as such). Shorting in securities 
follows the same story.111 
The interesting situations to watch are where a type of good or service 
becomes “commodified.” In other words, the good or service either had, 
or was perceived to have, enough variability from unit to unit that it had 
to be priced according to the unique value of any particular unit, but then 
over time either the actual variability among the units, or the perception 
of that variability, changed and the market began treating the pricing as 
category wide rather than unit by unit. Services can be tougher 
candidates for commodification because custom variation almost seems 
to be part of the nature of services (as opposed to goods). At the same 
time, many services have become so routinized, or even outright 
automated, that one can see them as fungible commodity-type purchases. 
Quick oil change services, for example, come to mind, but it could be 
that those are still value or premium sales. 
From the other end of the spectrum, it is possible for items in a 
commodities category to move their way “up” in the world and be 
“decommodified.” I recently spoke at a conference on food security 
issues and noticed that many speakers were decrying the 
“commodification of food.” When it was my turn, I pointed out that this 
                                                     
110. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON AND RICHARD A. BOOTH, BUSINESS BASICS FOR LAW 
STUDENTS: ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS § 15.4 (Aspen Publishers 4th ed. 2006). 
111. At the same time, of course, securities futures can be traded in commodities markets as well 
as securities markets. See 17 C.F.R. pt. 41 (2006). 
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was truly odd as many food categories formed the original or archetypal 
commodities (grains, pork bellies, etc.).112 Further, I pointed out that the 
real story is how many food producers have found ways to decommodify 
their products.113 
But the foregoing suggests another interesting thing about 
“commodification”: it is apparently a pejorative term to many. In one 
way this makes sense: when something is, or has become, a commodity, 
this means it has no individual value. This plays into Kafka-esque and 
Orwellian fears of people being reduced to numbers or mere “cogs in the 
machine.” And indeed, when Professor Margaret Jane Radin published 
her famous book, Contested Commodities, much of what she was 
concerned about was the commodification of babies, body parts, and 
other essentially human objects.114 But how much should this type of 
fear transfer over to the commodification of non-human objects? Animal 
rights activists may well feel that buying and selling farm animals as 
commodities debases the dignity of these creatures. And clearly many 
individuals in the organic and other “natural” food movements feel that 
treating plant foodstuffs as commodities is somehow undignified as 
well,115 although it is less clear who or what is being debased in this 
scenario. 
Nonetheless, while in private practice in the late 1990s and working 
on a high profile matter for one of the then Big Five accounting firms, I 
quickly discovered the open secret in the accounting profession that the 
statutory audit was essentially a commodity sold on price and often used 
as a loss leader to bring in the more lucrative consulting services. It was 
also clear that this had not always been the case. My curiosity as to how 
the statutory audit had become commodified was thus the genesis of this 
and my earlier publications on the topic.116 In an earlier piece I posted to 
                                                     
112. And, of course, these archetypal food types are contained in the definition of “commodities” 
in the Commodities Exchange Act. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(4) (2000). 
113. See, e.g., MICHAEL POLLAN, THE OMNIVORE’S DILEMMA: A NATURAL HISTORY OF FOUR 
MEALS 239–61 (2006). 
114. MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 1–15 (Harvard University Press, 
1996); see also ARJUN APPADURAI, RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION 1–29 (Martha M. Ertman and 
Joan C. Williams eds., N.Y.U. Press 2005). Note that Radin was using “commodification” in its 
broader sense of having market value generally, not necessarily in the narrower way that I am using 
it to designate fully interchangeable fungible units. 
115. See POLLAN, supra note 113, at 239–61.  
116. While most of the themes of this article were firmly in place for me by the time I left private 
practice in 2001, I had a hard time getting earlier drafts placed, in part because there were few 
public sources available for me to cite to support my central themes, and in part because few people 
seemed to understand what I meant by “commodification of the audit.” Fortunately, I finally posted 
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Social Science Research Network (SSRN), I began exploring what 
accountants were doing for revenue sources before the statutory audit 
came along.117 From there it became clear that the real story to follow 
was how revenue from statutory audits came to dominate the accounting 
firms’ overall income stream. After that, the narrative could shift to how 
that core service line and revenue stream wound up being a low margin 
albatross for the firms—with low, to no, to sometimes even negative 
margins, but indispensable because it employed so many people and 
provided a golden entry point for audit partners to cross-sell the highly 
lucrative consulting services offered by other parts of the firm. The 
details of this transformation occupy Part II.A below. 
In the end, the story behind the commodification of the statutory audit 
is a simple one, but it is wrapped within a second, fairly complex story. 
The simple story is that once the statutory audit was locked into place, it 
changed the dynamics for the audit market so profoundly that, arguably, 
few parties grasped the full impact of the change for a number of years. 
In essence, an audit that companies took on voluntarily could operate as 
a quality-signaling mechanism to the markets. Showing that one could 
get a clean certification from a respected accounting firm, or that one 
could get listed on the NYSE, should arguably have increased the 
number of prospective investors and lowered the price of capital for the 
company because investors could be given evidence that the company 
was sound and not run with excessively risky business or accounting 
practices.118 But once the audit was regulated and required of each and 
every publicly traded company, there was no longer any signal to be 
sent, other than that one had complied with the law.119 Presumably, one 
could still choose high-reputation accounting firms in an attempt to 
signal quality to the marketplace, and this practice seemed to hold for 
                                                     
a version on SSRN in early 2002. O’Connor, supra note 77. I continue to be grateful to Jack Coffee, 
Bill Bratton, and Larry Cunningham who were all willing to give me a much needed boost by citing 
the SSRN working paper in articles that appeared shortly thereafter. Interestingly enough, about a 
year or so after the SSRN piece had been circulated and widely cited, the idea of a commodified 
audit began appearing in other articles and finally appears to have gained currency. See, e.g., Macey 
& Sale, supra note 77, at 1177–78. 
117. O’Connor, supra note 77, at 3–6. 
118. I have found no hard evidence that voluntary audits did reduce the cost of capital for 
companies who undertook them however. By the same token, I do not know of any definitive 
evidence that the mandatory statutory audit has reduced the cost of capital to publicly traded 
companies either. 
119. A similar point is made by Professors Butler and Ribstein. See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra 
note 73, at 29. 
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the first years after the implementation of the statutory audit. Yet, over 
time, awareness appeared to sink into the marketplace that the SEC 
essentially regulated the accountants who wanted to perform statutory 
audits, and that thus so long as one chose an SEC “approved” accounting 
firm for the statutory audit, then this was as much signaling as one 
needed in the marketplace. This then meant that the statutory audit 
shifted to the realm of mere legal compliance for many companies and 
the downward slide to commodification was set in place. The more 
complex, second story is about the inextricably entwined strands of the 
statutory audit, growth of the size and scope of the largest American 
businesses, and growth and consolidation of first the Big Eight and then 
the Big Four firms in the accounting profession. This more complex 
story will be considered in the next Part. 
In sum, this Part has reviewed the origins of the problem of auditor 
independence and set the stage for the causes behind the 
commodification of the statutory audit. In the next Part, I consider the 
growth and consolidation of the accounting profession that stemmed 
from the initial windfall of the statutory audit franchise. But this very 
growth and consolidation also exacerbated the trend towards 
commodification. It also led to a veritable bramble bush of auditor 
independence rules and, ultimately, an environment in which meaningful 
auditor independence is simply impossible. 
II. CAPTURED AUDITORS AND A BRAMBLE BUSH OF 
INDEPENDENCE RULES 
In Part A of this Section, I begin by following the intertwined themes 
of the growth in size and scope of both the major accounting firms and 
large American businesses. I then summarize the effects of the statutory 
audit on the former’s services and practice. To illustrate such growth and 
the resulting effects of the statutory audit, I use Arthur Andersen as a 
case study. In Part B, I provide a historical survey of auditor 
independence rules issued under a number of different sources. I 
conclude this Part by examining the current state of auditor regulation 
after the implementation of SOX. In sum, this Part sets the stage for how 
auditors were effectively captured by management, despite increasingly 
complicated independence rules. 
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A. Growth and Consolidation of the Accounting Profession 
Because the former Arthur Andersen accounting firm was often at the 
forefront as the profession developed after World War II, and then 
imploded in the most dramatic set of circumstances of any of the then 
Big Five, it serves as an excellent case study to illuminate key changes 
in the profession. Arthur Andersen, the founder, took over an existing 
audit practice in 1913 even as he remained as head of the accounting 
department at Northwestern University.120 Purportedly from the 
beginning, he exhorted both his students and employees to “look beyond 
the numbers” in performing accounting work because he believed that 
many valuable insights could be gleaned by the business-savvy 
accountant reviewing the detailed financial transactions of a company.121 
Andersen also is claimed to have had an interest in systems consulting 
and advisory services from the very beginning.122 The new firm, like 
many others of the time, profited from the passage of the new federal 
income tax law in 1913123 and began creating a tax practice to 
complement the core accounting/audit practice.124 But perhaps distinct 
from other accounting firms, it began an “industrial engineering” 
practice in 1918 specifically to focus on this idea of “looking beyond the 
numbers” to assist client management in effectively running the 
business.125 “Our investigations seek to show the strong or weak points 
in company position or management, and our installations seek 
to . . . correct such weak spots.”126 That same year, the firm changed its 
name to Arthur Andersen & Co.127 
During the 1920s, the firm grew steadily, opening offices in New 
York, Kansas City, Los Angeles, and San Francisco.128 Throughout the 
                                                     
120. VISION OF GRANDEUR, supra note 68, at 6. Andersen is claimed to be the first university 
professor to move from teaching to the practice of public accounting. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Tariff of 1913 (Underwood Tariff Act), Pub. L. No. 63-16, 38 Stat. 114 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (2000)); see also O’Connor, supra note 1, at 778, 783–
85; GARY JOHN PREVITS AND BARBARA DUBIS MERINO, A HISTORY OF ACCOUNTANCY IN THE 
UNITED STATES: THE CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ACCOUNTING 254–56 (Ohio State University 
Press 1998). 
124. See VISION OF GRANDEUR, supra note 68, at 17. 
125. See id. at 18. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 19.  
128. Id. at 24. 
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twenties, the firm also began developing a reputation for advising 
businesses in mergers and acquisitions.129 Not surprisingly, the firm’s 
revenues declined somewhat in the early years of the 1930s. But, 
because of the multiple practice areas that it had developed, Arthur 
Andersen & Co. was able to focus resources on service lines like tax and 
public utility rate investigations and thus soften the decline of audits and 
merger related services.130 Subsequently, the firm accelerated its move 
into its emerging industrial engineering service line once the economy 
picked up again during and after World War II.131 During the 1930s, the 
firm also managed to open more offices in the United States and begin 
international affiliations with foreign accounting firms.132 
When the war effort of the early 1940s dramatically reinvigorated 
industry and the economy, accounting firms such as Arthur Andersen & 
Co. benefited as well.133 Major American businesses grew larger in the 
size and scope of their activities, so accounting firms had to grow in size 
and complexity with their clients just to be able to continue providing 
the statutory audit.134 In the 1950s, Arthur Andersen & Co. capitalized 
on the substantial developments in logistics, personnel, and management 
technologies that originated in the war effort to grow the industrial 
engineering program, now called the “systems practice.”135 Yet this 
initiative was not cheap and the returns on the budding systems practice 
were minimal in the early years. Further, the firm was engaged in 
aggressive growth and expansion geographically and in other service 
areas. All of this required the partners to forego significant amounts of 
income that could otherwise have been paid as partner profits.136 
                                                     
129. See id. at 27.  
130. Id. at 40. 
131. Id. at 91–99. 
132. Id. at 42–44, 48. 
133. See id. at 67–73. 
134. See id. at 84–86. 
135. Id. at 84–91. The systems practice became known first as “administrative accounting” and 
then “administrative services” in 1951, a name it kept until eventually changing to “management 
information consulting” in 1980. Id. at 93. It had its first major computer installation project for 
General Electric around 1953. Id. at 95–96. Following this successful project, the administrative 
services practice finally began realizing the potential its supporters had long argued for, although in 
fact the service line was still not a big revenue source. Id. at 94–99. 
136. Id. at 91. This history of reinvestment would later crop up as one of the sorest points for 
audit and tax practice partners when the systems practice—later renamed again to “Andersen 
Consulting”—sought and won their essentially cost-free walkout from the Arthur Andersen 
Worldwide Organization in 2000. See infra notes 153–160, 170–172 and accompanying text.  
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Nonetheless, throughout the 1960s, the yet again renamed 
“administrative services practice” would expand dramatically through 
major corporate and government systems installations and even into 
software creation and sales to smaller businesses.137 Tax services also 
experienced a powerful upswing throughout the decade.138 
But already in the 1960s, signs of the commodification of the audit 
were appearing: 
Price competition between auditors can be intense—though 
price cutting in order to get an account is officially deplored in 
the profession . . . Al Jennings, the senior partner of Lybrand, 
Ross Bros. and Montgomery, recalled recently that his firm had 
lost a big account to another of the Big Eight, which put in a 
‘loss-leader’ bid—after it had managed to wangle an invitation 
to make a presentation. Firms often submit such bids . . . in the 
hope that after they get a foot in the door, they can gradually 
expand the volume of their work and their fees.139 
By the 1970s, the large accounting firm structure that dominated until 
the early 2000s—an international, multi-disciplinary organization with 
audit/accounting, tax, and consulting divisions—was firmly in place in 
Arthur Andersen as well as the rest of the Big Eight firms.140 Arthur 
Andersen also entered the world of true multinational partnerships with 
the establishment of Arthur Andersen & Co., Société Coopérative 
(AASC) in Geneva, Switzerland.141 
                                                     
137. See VISION OF GRANDEUR, supra note 68, at 125–28. 
138. PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 123, at 328–30. 
139. T.A. Wise, The Auditors Have Arrived, FORTUNE, Nov. 1960, as cited in A VISION OF 
GRANDEUR, supra note 68, at 119.  
140. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS: MANDATED STUDY ON 
CONSOLIDATION AND COMPETITION 8 (July 2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d03864.pdf [hereinafter GAO STUDY]. The Big Eight consisted of Arthur Andersen, Peat Marwick 
Mitchell, Coopers & Lybrand, Ernst & Whinney, Price Waterhouse, Arthur Young, Deloitte 
Haskins & Sells, and Touche Ross. Id. at 11. I have not found a good account of when the major 
accounting firms coalesced into the official Big Eight. 
141. VISION OF GRANDEUR, supra note 68, at 138–39; Andersen Consulting Bus. Unit Member 
Firms v. Arthur Andersen Bus. Unit Member Firms and Andersen Worldwide Société Coopérative, 
Int’l Comm. Arb., Case No. 9797/CK/AER/ACS, at 10–14 (July 28, 2000) [hereinafter Arbitration 
Award]. This capped a firm restructuring that focused on how to allow offices in various countries 
to fully comply with national laws, and be viewed as national or native firms, while still retaining 
the “one firm” culture that Andersen had long cultivated. Id. The solution was based around 
establishing legal partnerships in each country where the firm offered its services, while having all 
of those partnerships sign a member firm inter-firm agreement (MFIFA) with AASC. Id. The 
collection of all of the national member firms, known as the Arthur Andersen Worldwide 
Organization (AAWO), was administered by AASC, which alone “sets policy, establishes and 
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Across the profession, meanwhile, the management consulting 
divisions of the Big Eight grew rapidly, and by 1975 they accounted for 
eleven percent of the firms’ total revenues on average, with a range of 
five to sixteen percent for specific firms.142 At the same time, audits of 
the increasingly complex and large publicly traded companies required 
increasingly sophisticated audit techniques.143 The number of 
accountants skyrocketed from 9,500 in 1945 to nearly 104,000 in 
1973.144 The floodgates of competition were also opened when the FTC, 
Department of Justice (DOJ), and individuals threatened legal actions 
against the professional services organizations, including accounting, 
alleging that the traditional restraint on advertising self-imposed by most 
of these organizations was actually improper restraint of trade.145 This 
new ability to advertise and openly compete likely broke down the last 
bulwark against complete commodification of the audit. 
By the 1980s, “[t]he age of ‘auditing as king’ was passing, as other 
attest,146 tax, and advisory services were offered to assist businesses 
facing an increasingly complex legal, international, and technological 
environment.”147 Solidification of the trend started at least as early as the 
1960s—accountants, however, did not begin to talk openly about 
commodification until the Reagan era. At that time, Duane Kullberg, 
                                                     
monitors worldwide quality standards and coordinates training for all Arthur Andersen personnel.” 
VISION OF GRANDEUR, supra note 68, at 139. Further, “[e]ach partner in a national member firm 
also is a partner in the [AA]SC.” Id.; see also Arbitration Award at 11–12. Essentially, a hub and 
spoke network was formed with AASC as the hub, connected to each and every national member 
firm by a MFIFA. 
142. GAO STUDY, supra note 140, at 8–9. For comparison, in 1975, audit/attest services 
accounted for approximately 70 percent of revenues on average, and tax services filled out the 
roughly 19 percent of remaining revenues on average. Id. See also Press Release, Securities and 
Exchange Commission, SEC Chairman Levitt Proposes Rulemaking, Other Measures to Maintain 
Quality of Financial Reporting (May 10, 2000) (on file with author) (giving these figures for 1977 
as 12 percent for management consulting services, 70 percent for audit/attest services, and 18 
percent for tax services). 
143. See PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 123, at 332. 
144. Id. 
145. See GAO STUDY, supra note 140, at 8; see also VISION OF GRANDEUR, supra note 68, at 
144–45. 
146. Attest services are “engagements . . . in which a certified public accountant in the practice of 
public accounting . . . is engaged to issue or does issue an examination, a review, or an agreed-upon 
procedures report on subject matter, or an assertion about the subject matter . . . , that is the 
responsibility of another party.” AICPA, STATEMENTS ON STANDARDS FOR ATTESTATION 
ENGAGEMENTS (SSAES) 10 § 101.01 (2002), available at http://www.aicpa.org/download/ 
members/div/auditstd/AT-00101.PDF.  
147. PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 123, at 349. 
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CEO of Arthur Andersen & Co., argued that “[c]ompetition is keener 
than ever among the major accounting firms, and some of our 
competitors seem to consider their services as commodities for sale at a 
price.”148 In response to this trend toward commodification, and given 
the new permission to advertise, accounting firms attempted to 
differentiate their audits: “As the marketplace has become more 
cutthroat, each of the Big Eight has striven to find ways to distinguish its 
product to make it seem brighter, shinier and better able to do the 
job.”149 Yet “[a]ll have been seemingly unsuccessful in persuading 
clients or prospective clients that this or that audit technique is 
superior.”150 Summing up the net result of the profession’s advertising 
campaign against the audit-as-commodity, an accounting firm marketer 
was quoted as saying that: 
[t]he downside to all this . . . is that the job the profession as a 
whole has done best is to convince buyers that the audit is a 
commodity. The firms certainly didn’t set out to do that, but the 
overuse of fee-cutting as a sales technique has had exactly that 
effect. It will take time and some very thoughtful, client-focused 
marketing to repair the damage we have done to ourselves by 
treating the audit as a loss-leader.151 
Yet, given a mandatory statutory audit with the primary requirement 
being the auditor’s ability to satisfy the SEC that he and/or his firm is 
“independent,” it seems inevitable that firms found themselves 
competing on price for commodified audit services. 
At the same time, the Big Eight seemed to get caught up in the 
general merger frenzy of the late 1980s. The first major merger of the 
period, involving Peat Marwick Mitchell, followed the earlier 
accounting firm merger model of acquiring offshore firms to extend the 
firm’s international reach and/or to service specific U.S. based clients.152 
Thus the merger of Peat Marwick Mitchell and Europe’s Klynveld Main 
Goerdeler in 1987 did not materially change the Big Eight, although it 
did allow the combined entity, KPMG, to become the largest accounting 
firm worldwide and the second largest U.S. firm—at least for a couple of 
                                                     
148. VISION OF GRANDEUR, supra note 68, at 119. 
149. Id. at 145 (quoting Peter W. Bernstein, Competition Comes to Accounting, FORTUNE (July 
17, 1978)). 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 145. 
152. GAO STUDY, supra note 140, at 10–11. 
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years.153 In 1989, four of the Big Eight were involved in mergers to form 
the Big Six: Ernst & Whinney and Arthur Young teamed up to form 
Ernst & Young, while Deloitte Haskins & Sells merged with Touche 
Ross to create Deloitte & Touche.154 
Arthur Andersen resisted this merger interest, but underwent a 
significant restructuring. Based in part on the increasing friction between 
audit/attest and tax partners, on the one hand, and management 
consulting partners, on the other, AASC encouraged member firms to 
split the management of the two sides at the office level.155 In 1988, 
AASC even created the new name of “Andersen Consulting” for the new 
business division.156 While the Aurther Andersen Worldwide 
Organization (AAWO) was not the only Big Six organization to 
experience the increasing accountant/consultant friction, it did ultimately 
take the growing gap to a more dramatic resolution.157 
Unable to slow the momentum of the two business divisions growing 
apart, AASC seems to have decided to at least use the increasingly clear 
separation of the division to its advantage: in 1990 it created new legal 
entities in the United States and many other countries and transferred the 
Andersen Consulting division personnel and assets into them.158 Around 
the same time, Arthur Andersen LLP, the U.S. audit/tax member firm, 
requested (and received) a “no-action” letter from the SEC that it would 
not consider the accounting firm’s independence to be impaired where 
the new Andersen Consulting LLP, the U.S. consulting member firm, 
performed non-audit services for an Arthur Andersen LLP audit 
                                                     
153. Id. Of note, by 1986, Arthur Andersen had become the largest U.S. accounting firm, and it 
maintained this position even after KPMG was created, although KPMG later displaced Arthur 
Andersen as the world’s largest accounting firm. Id.; VISION OF GRANDEUR, supra note 68, at 170–
71. 
154. GAO STUDY, supra note 140, at 11. The Big Six were Arthur Andersen, Price Waterhouse, 
KPMG Peat Marwick, Ernst & Young, Deloitte Touch, and Coopers & Lybrand. Arthur Andersen 
and Price Waterhouse reportedly contemplated a merger that same year, but it never came to 
fruition. Id. Nonetheless, Arthur Andersen remained the largest firm in the U.S. after the 1989 
mergers. Id. 
155. VISION OF GRANDEUR, supra note 68, at 153, 176–77; Arbitration Award, supra note 141, at 
12–14. Arguably, this separation was also designed to allow greater freedom for consulting in 
particular to develop both its practice and its approaches to the market. See VISION OF GRANDEUR, 
supra note 79, at 176–77; Arbitration Award, supra note 141, at 12–14. 
156. VISION OF GRANDEUR, supra note 68, at 176–77; Arbitration Award, supra note 141, at 12–
14. 
157. VISION OF GRANDEUR, supra note 68, at 176–77. 
158. Arbitration Award, supra note 141, at 12–21. 
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client.159 The basis of this—at least as argued in the no-action request 
letter submitted by then-Fried Frank partner Harvey Pitt—was that 
because there would be no common control or management of the two 
U.S. member firms, as well as no direct profit or loss sharing, they were 
in all practical ways separate firms and audit engagement partners’ 
independence would not be impaired.160 Across all of the Big Six during 
the 1990s, consulting revenues grew 27% annually on average, while 
audit revenues grew by only nine percent.161 By the end of the decade, 
one estimate pegged audit revenues as comprising only 30% of total 
revenues on average, while consulting revenues accounted for more than 
50% of total revenues.162 In 1998, two more firms within the Big Six 
merged to create the Big Five: Price Waterhouse and Coopers & 
Lybrand combined to form Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC).163 A recent 
General Accounting Office study (GAO Study)164 estimates that 
management consulting revenues comprised 45 percent of the Big Five’s 
total revenues on average in 1998, with a range of 34 to 70 percent for 
specific firms.165 Audit/attest revenues were then approximately 35 
percent of total revenues on average, and tax revenues rounded out the 
remaining approximately 20 percent of total revenues on average.166 But 
note that whichever firm or firms recorded 70 percent of total revenues 
from consulting revenues then had only 30 percent of revenues coming 
from the combination of both tax and audit/attest revenues. This 
represented a tremendous shift from only a couple of decades earlier 
when management consulting services generated a negligible percentage 
of revenues for any of the big firms. 
At this time, out of the Big Five, only Arthur Andersen was able to 
successfully separate out its consulting practice. Thus, while the other 
organizations increasingly found themselves mired in independence 
                                                     
159. See Arthur Andersen & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 79,484 (June 20, 
1990) [hereinafter AA No-Action Letter]. 
160. Id. 
161. See Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Chairman Levitt Proposes 
Rulemaking, Other Measures to Maintain Quality of Financial Reporting (May 10, 2000) (on file 
with author). 
162. See id. 
163. See GAO STUDY, supra note 140, at 12. The Big Five consisted of Arthur Andersen, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young, Deloitte & Touche, and KPMG. 
164. See id. at 1–3; see also Pub. L. 107-204 § 701 (2002) (requiring the GAO to study the 
consolidation of the accounting profession and its effects on the market for audit services). 
165. GAO STUDY, supra note 140, at 8–9. 
166. See id. at 9 fig.1.  
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violations by non-audit services that forced them to choose clients for 
either audit/tax or consulting, the Andersen twins sailed ahead 
delivering both sides of the practice division to the same clients. Just as a 
matter of the universe of potential clients for a firm, this state of affairs 
essentially doubled that universe for the Andersens over that of their 
competitors. The post-merger PwC, in particular, found itself the 
unhappy subject of an SEC-commissioned report that found an alarming 
number of independence violations—many stemming from the difficulty 
of ferreting out all the independence related conflicts latent in the merger 
of two Big Six firms.167 
Accordingly, Arthur Andersen LLP’s no-action letter should have 
been phenomenally valuable to both it and Andersen Consulting LLP. 
This would have been particularly true in 2000 when the SEC revised its 
independence rules to more directly restrict the provision of non-audit 
services to audit clients, and yet again more critical after SOX 
essentially codified those restrictions.168 But, perhaps as just a classic 
greed story, or perhaps because of some poorly managed legitimate 
grievances, the Andersen Consulting member firms around the world 
collectively filed an arbitration under the binding arbitration clauses of 
their member firm agreements with AASC in 1997.169 Their main 
complaint was that they were unfairly “subsidizing” the audit/tax 
member firms under the cost sharing provisions in the member firm 
agreements even as the audit/tax firms were building a competing 
service line under the name of “Arthur Andersen Business 
Consulting.”170 To summarize, in 2000, a sole arbitrator from Colombia 
named Guillermo Gamba Posada allowed the Andersen Consulting 
member firms from around the world to walk away from the AAWO 
without paying back any of the decades of substantial investments made 
by generations of Arthur Andersen partners along the long road to the 
systems consulting practice at the expense of their own personal 
income171—monies that with the interest that would have accrued over 
                                                     
167. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM’N, REPORT OF THE INTERNAL INVESTIGATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE ISSUES AT PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP (AP File No. 3-9809) (Jan. 6, 2000) 
(report prepared by independent consultant Jess Fardella, Esq. et. al of the New York law firm 
Lankler, Siffert & Wohl LLP). See also Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Independent Consultant Finds Widespread Independence Violations at PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
2000-4 (Jan. 6, 2000) (on file with author). 
168. See infra Part II.B. 
169. Arbitration Award, supra note 141, at 2–4. 
170. See, e.g., id. at 32, 50. 
171. See id. at 116–18; see also O’Connor, supra note 1, at 826–27; O’Connor, supra note 77, at 
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the decades I assume would have dwarfed the monies that the Andersen 
Consulting firms only started sending back into the AAWO beginning in 
the 1990s. Thus, in the end, Arthur Andersen LLP received only a 
fraction of the benefit that the no-action letter should have afforded it. 
AAWO’s loss of Andersen Consulting should have been a gain for 
the other Big Five organizations because they at least still had consulting 
practices. Yet in retrospect it turns out that 1997 was the high water 
mark for revenues from consulting services as a percentage of total 
revenues on average.172 In 1998, there was a modest decrease in this 
percentage, but also a modest decrease in the revenues from audit/attest 
services as a percentage of total revenue.173 However, in 1999, roles 
reversed and the percentage of revenues from audit/attest was roughly 
equal to that from consulting as audit/attest services began a sharp up-
tick inversely related to the beginning of consulting’s precipitous 
drop.174 By 2002, audit/attest revenues were nearly 60 percent of total 
revenues on average, while consulting revenues were below their 1975 
levels at 10 percent of total revenues on average.175 
Of course, the arbitration debacle was not the end of the indignities 
for the once-mighty AAWO. Arthur Andersen LLP was Enron’s auditor; 
and as the latter imploded in a spectacular and almost completely 
unexpected bankruptcy, the SEC began an investigation of the 
accounting firm as well.176 After the SEC discovered that documents 
related to the audit of Enron had been shredded—allegedly simply in 
conformance with Arthur Andersen LLP’s general document retention 
policy177—the firm was indicted in March 2002 on one count of criminal 
                                                     
57–58; Nathan Koppel, Going For Broke, THE AMERICAN LAWYER 117–18 (November 2000). 
172. GAO STUDY, supra note 140, at 9 fig.1. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States (Andersen II), 544 U.S. 696, 698–702 (2005). 
177. Although it might seem odd at first blush that a document retention policy would call for the 
destruction of documents, it is not at all unusual. Companies and firms today find themselves 
overwhelmed by an enormous number of documents. It is entirely reasonable for them to not retain 
every document, but rather only those that are required to be retained by specific laws or 
professional duties. Thus, once a document is no longer necessary to retain, it may be disposed of. 
Document retention policies should clearly set forth which documents must be retained and for how 
long, as well as how and when to purge documents that are no longer necessary to retain. See 
Christopher R. Chase, To Shred Or Not To Shred: Document Retention Policies and Federal 
Obstruction of Justice Statutes, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 721, 724–25 (2003). But even 
beyond this, professional services firms such as those in accounting and law that deal with 
confidential client information need to also focus on the disposal of documents containing such 
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obstruction of justice in the federal District Court for the Southern 
District of Texas.178 Once the firm was indicted, a “mass exodus of 
Andersen partners and staff as well as clients” commenced.179 This 
apparently was true for the other national member firms of the AAWO, 
even though it did not necessarily have to happen that way. Nonetheless, 
when, on June 15, the jury returned a guilty verdict, Arthur Andersen 
LLP and the rest of the AAWO began winding down their affairs.180 The 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the verdict, including a 
controversial jury instruction, in 2004.181 However, in a maddening turn 
of events for former AAWO employees, the U.S. Supreme Court 
overturned the conviction in a unanimous opinion holding that the trial 
court’s jury instruction on the definition of the obstruction of justice 
statute at issue was fundamentally flawed.182 None of this did any good 
for the firm, however, which for all intents and purposes went out of 
business in 2002.183 
Among the now Big Four firms remaining after Andersen’s demise, 
the precipitous drop in consulting revenues as a percentage of total 
revenues was due to the divestiture of all but one of their consulting 
practices. In 2002, PwC sold its consulting practice to IBM.184 Ernst & 
Young sold its consulting arm to Cap Gemini in 2000185 and KPMG 
spun off its consulting division as BearingPoint, a company which then 
went public in 2001.186 Thus, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu has remained 
the only hold-out, shelving plans in 2003 to spin off its consulting arm, 
                                                     
information. Disposal by means of the trash or recycling could potentially compromise those 
confidences, and so a specific mandate to shred or otherwise destroy such documents after they are 
no longer necessary to retain is the best course of action. 
178. Andersen II, 544 U.S. at 702. 
179. GAO STUDY, supra note 140, at 12. 
180. United States v. Arthur Andersen LLP (Andersen I), 374 F.3d 281, 284 (5th Cir. 2004); 
Jonathan D. Glater, Last Task at Andersen: Turning Out the Lights, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2002, at 
C3. 
181. Andersen I, 374 F.3d at 284. 
182. Andersen II, 544 U.S. at 708. 
183. Jonathan D. Glater, supra note 180.  
184. Barney Jopson, E&Y Poaches Capgemini Staff, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2005, at 15; William 
M. Bulkeley and Kemba Dunham, IBM Speeds Move to Consulting With $3.5 Billion Acquisition,  
WALL ST. J., July 31, 2002, at A1. 
185. Jopson, supra note 184, at 15.  
186. Ellen McCarthy, BearingPoint Posts Results For 2004, Details Troubles, THE WASH. POST, 
Feb. 1, 2006, at D01.  
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Deloitte Consulting, which was to have been called “Braxton” post-spin-
off.187 
The audit marketplace for large publicly traded companies has been 
described as a “tight oligopoly” by the GAO.188 In fact, the Big Four 
audit more than 97 percent of all publicly traded companies with sales 
over $250 million.189 Further, the gap in size between any of the Big 
Four—measured on the basis of either employees or revenues—and the 
next largest, second tier accounting firms is dramatic.190 For example, 
KPMG had the lowest of the annual revenues of the Big Four for 2002 at 
$3.2 billion, but the fifth largest firm in the United States, Grant 
Thornton, had annual revenues of only $400 million for the same year.191 
Similarly, KPMG employed the lowest number of employees of the Big 
Four, with a total of 12,502 partners and professional staff combined in 
2002, while Grant Thornton employed 2,380 partners and professional 
staff combined in that year.192 Additionally, and critical in a globalized 
professional services marketplace, the Big Four dominate internationally 
as well.193 
Based on the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) employed by the 
DOJ and the FTC to determine market concentration and potential 
market power, the GAO determined that the market for big public 
company audits (i.e., audits of companies with annual sales over $100 
million) is highly concentrated.194 In this segment, the HHI was 2,566 
for 2002 (after Andersen’s collapse), far above the 1,800 threshold used 
to indicate significant potential for market power among the firms in a 
market segment.195 However, even in 1998, after the merger that created 
PwC, the HHI had jumped from below the potential market power 
                                                     
187. Deloitte Consulting LLP, HOOVER’S IN-DEPTH COMPANY RECORDS, 2006 WLNR 5445788 
(Apr. 1, 2006). 
188.  GAO STUDY, supra note 140, at 16. The GAO defines the term “oligopoly” as representing 
any market in which the top four firms control more than 60 percent of the market and there are 
significant barriers to entry for other firms. Id. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. at 17 tbl.1.  
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. at 18. For example, in 2002, the Big Four audited over 80 percent of all public companies 
in Japan, at least 90 percent of all listed companies in the Netherlands, and virtually all of the major 
listed companies in the U.K. Id. For 2001, the Big Five audited over 80 percent of listed companies 
in Italy. Id. 
194. Id. at 18–19. 
195. Id. 
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threshold of 1800 to well above 2,000.196 By a different measure, the 
four-firm concentration ratio,197 the public company audit marketplace 
looks equally locked down. Whereas the top four of the Big Eight in 
1988198 collectively controlled 63 percent of total sales audited, in 1997 
the top four of the Big Six199 controlled 71 percent of that metric, and by 
2002, post-Andersen, the Big Four controlled 99 percent of total sales 
audited.200 
Yet, despite this market concentration, the GAO Study concluded that 
consolidation in the profession has not yet impaired price competition.201 
In fact, the GAO Study found that the model of a marketplace driven 
solely by pure price competition—essentially a commodity market—
accurately predicted the actual audit marketplace, even though market 
participants believe that other factors such as quality, reputation, and 
global reach play a role.202 The GAO’s model simulation further 
suggested that, even in a pure price competition market, a high degree of 
concentration could result.203 The big question is whether any of the 
national accounting firms outside of the Big Four—such as Grant 
Thornton, BDO Seidman, or McGladrey & Pullen—could either through 
organic growth, or through merger or acquisition, begin to offer viable 
alternatives to the Big Four for large public company audits. 
Unfortunately, the answer to this seems to be no.204 
Finally, the GAO Study could not reach a conclusion on whether the 
consolidation of the audit marketplace had negatively impacted either 
audit quality or auditor independence.205 But this was primarily because 
audit quality and auditor independence are difficult to measure.206 Thus, 
                                                     
196. Id. 
197. “The four-firm concentration ratio is the aggregate sales audited by the top four firms as a 
percentage of total sales audited.” Id. at 20 n.14. 
198. Price Waterhouse, Coopers & Lybrand, Arthur Andersen, and KPMG. 
199. Ernst & Young, Price Waterhouse, Deloitte & Touche, and Arthur Andersen. 
200. GAO STUDY, supra note 140, at 21 fig.5. 
201. Id. at 25–26. 
202. See id. at 25. 
203. Id. at 25. 
204. See id. at 26–30, 45–52. At the same time, these smaller firms have not been without their 
own independence-related scandals—for example, Grant Thornton’s Italian affiliate was the 
external auditor for the parts of the Parmalat empire that seemed most involved in that company’s 
financial scandal. See Alessandra Galloni, David Reilly, and Carrick Mollenkamp, Skimmed Off: 
Parmalat Inquiry Finds Basic Ruses At Heart of Scandal, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2003, at A1. 
205.  GAO STUDY, supra note 140, at 35. 
206. See id. at 35–40. 
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without being able to objectively determine that audit quality or auditor 
independence have decreased over the period of accounting firm 
consolidation, it is difficult to assert that consolidation had any impact 
on either issue.207 That said, the GAO Study confirmed that the behavior 
of the market for statutory audits is in fact consistent with a model of the 
market based on pure price competition.208 In other words, the statutory 
audit is not a premium service, but rather, a commodity service. 
The retrenchment of the accounting firms into audit/attest and tax 
practices, now nearly all devoid of serious consulting arms, presents a 
new environment in which the firms will have to create new business 
models. Only time will tell whether the Big Four will: (i) attempt to use 
their potential market power to increase audit fees in a bid to elevate the 
audit marketplace above a low (or no) margin service; (ii) begin to 
regrow some non-audit consulting services that allow them to still 
comply with the new auditor independence regime under SOX; (iii) 
simply accept that they are commodity service providers and compete on 
price; or (iv) some combination of the foregoing. But, before fully 
considering the implications of all of the developments in the profession 
since the imposition of the statutory audit under the ‘34 Act, it is 
important to trace the auditor independence rules that attempted to track 
these developments. 
B. The Bramble Bush of Auditor Independence Rules 
The accounting profession in the Unites States operates under a mix 
of external and self-regulation. On the external side, state accountancy 
boards act as gatekeepers of the basic “CPA” designation, as discussed 
above, by administering certification exams and setting basic rules for 
the practice and conduct of CPAs certified in that state.209 The SEC, and 
now the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) 
created under SOX,210 provide the remainder of this external regulation. 
Internal self-regulation comes from organizations such as the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, (AICPA) and, until recently, 
the Public Oversight Board (POB)211 and the Independence Standards 
                                                     
207. See id. at 35–40. 
208. See id. at 25–26. 
209. See, e.g., National Association of State Boards of Accountancy, Licensure and Practice, 
http://www.nasbatools.com/display_page (last visited Aug. 6, 2006). 
210. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, tit. I, 116 Stat. 745. 
211. See infra text accompanying notes 233–240. 
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Board (ISB).212 This Section outlines the auditor independence rules 
developed by each oversight body. It begins with the profession's self- 
regulatory mechanisms, then turns to the SEC's auditor independence 
rules in existence prior to SOX, and concludes with the SEC and 
PCAOB auditor independence rules in place after SOX. 
1. Independence Rules Under the Accounting Profession’s Self-
Regulatory Mechanisms 
In response to corporate accounting scandals in the 1990s, the AICPA 
revised its independence rules, which are codified in its Code of 
Professional Conduct (Code).213 Independence, as set out in Rule 101 of 
the Code, is a general matter for all members in public practice and not 
restricted to performance of statutory audits.214 Rule 101 simply states 
that the accountant “shall be independent in the performance of 
professional services as required by standards promulgated by bodies 
designated by [the AICPA].”215 Closely allied with Rule 101 is Rule 102 
covering integrity and objectivity: “In the performance of any 
professional service, a member shall maintain objectivity and integrity, 
shall be free of conflicts of interest, and shall not knowingly 
misrepresent facts or subordinate his or her judgment to others.”216 The 
standards alluded to in Rule 101 are then largely set out in a series of 
“Interpretations” included as part of the Code.217 
The primary Interpretation (Interpretation of Rule 101) contains three 
sets of broad prohibitions analogous to the SEC auditor independence 
rules. First, independence is impaired if the accountant218 has a direct or 
                                                     
212. See infra text accompanying notes 241–247. 
213. AICPA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (2006), available at http://www.aicpa.org/ 
about/code/index.htm (last visited June 15, 2002) [hereinafter CODE]. One of the AICPA’s 
progenitors, the American Association of Public Accountants (AAPA), established the precursor to 
the Code as part of its Bylaws in 1905. See RICHARD G. SCHROEDER AND MYRTLE W. CLARK, 
ACCOUNTING THEORY: TEXTS AND READINGS 797 (1998). This precursor simply prohibited 
members from allowing nonmembers to practice in the member’s name and prohibited the payment 
of referral fees. See id. After the AAPA became the IPA in 1916, and then the AIA in 1917, it 
amended the precursor to the Code to include prohibitions on contingency fees, competitive 
bidding, advertising, forecasts, and substantial financial interests in clients. See id. Only in 1934, in 
response to the passage of the Securities Laws, did the AIA adopt a rule on independence. See id. 
214. See CODE, supra note 213, § 101.01 (Rule 101). 
215. Id. 
216. Id. § 102.01 (Rule 102). 
217. See id. § 101.02–.17. 
218. Also analogous to the SEC rules, independence can be affected by a number of people 
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material indirect financial interest in the client, is a trustee or executor of 
a trust or estate that has a direct or material indirect financial interest in 
the client, has a co-investment with the client that is material to the 
accountant, or has a loan to or from the client.219 Second, independence 
is impaired if the accountant, any partners or professional employees of 
his firm, his immediate family, or any combination thereof, own more 
than five percent of a client.220 Third, independence is impaired if a 
partner or professional employee of the accountant’s firm was 
contemporaneously associated with the client as a (i) director, officer, 
employee, or other member of management, (ii) promoter, underwriter, 
or voting trustee, or (iii) trustee for any pension or profit-sharing trust of 
the client.221 
Further Interpretations discuss the effects on independence where: (a) 
former partners of the accounting firm go to work for the audit client;222 
(b) the accountant performs management functions for audit clients;223 
(c) accountants accept honorary directorships or trusteeships of not-for-
profit organizations;224 (d) accountants accept loans from financial 
                                                     
besides the accountant(s) actually performing the audit engagement for the client including: 
a. An individual on the attest engagement team; b. An individual in a position to influence the 
attest engagement; c. A partner or manager who provides nonattest services to the attest client 
beginning once he or she provides ten hours of nonattest services to the client within any fiscal 
year and ending on the later of the date (i) the firm signs the report on the financial statements 
for the fiscal year during which those services were provided or (ii) he or she no longer expects 
to provide ten or more hours of nonattest services to the attest client on a recurring basis; d. A 
partner in the office in which the lead attest engagement partner primarily practices in 
connection with the attest engagement; e. The firm, including the firm’s employee benefit 
plans; or f. An entity whose operating, financial, or accounting policies can be controlled (as 
defined by generally accepted accounting principles [GAAP] for consolidation purposes) by 
any of the individuals or entities described in (a) through (e) or by two or more such 
individuals or entities if they act together. 
CODE,  supra note 213, § 92.06. 
219. See id. § 101.02(A). 
220. See id. § 101.02(B). 
221. See id. § 101.02(C). 
222. Id. § 101.04. 
223. Id. § 101.05. Examples of prohibited functions include: (i) authorizing, executing, or 
consummating a transaction, or otherwise exercising authority on behalf of a client or having the 
authority to do so; (ii) preparing source documents or originating data, in electronic or other form, 
evidencing the occurrence of a transaction; (iii) having custody of client assets; (iv) supervising 
client employees on the performance of their normal activities; (v) determining which 
recommendations of the accountant should be implemented; (vi) reporting to the board of directors 
on behalf of management; and (vii) serving as a client’s stock transfer or escrow agent, registrar, 
general counsel or its equivalent. Id. 
224. Id. § 101.06. 
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institution audit clients;225 (e) accountants or their firms are involved in 
actual or threatened litigation with clients, security holders of clients, or 
other third party litigation;226 (f) accountants invest together with an 
audit client in a third party (commonly called co-investments);227 
(g) accountants have relationships with third parties entities involved in 
the governance of an audit client;228 (h) the accountants engage in the 
provision of restricted-use reports (what I have been calling private 
audits) for audit clients;229 (i) accountants or their firm have cooperative 
arrangements with audit clients;230 and (j) accountants and/or their firms 
participate in or utilize “alternative practice structures.”231 
The POB oversaw the AICPA’s SEC Practice Section (SECPS)232 
from 1977 until the termination of POB operations in March of 2002.233 
While funded by the AICPA, the POB appointed its own members, set 
its own budget, and established its own operating procedures.234 The 
                                                     
225. Id. § 101.07. 
226. Id. § 101.08. 
227. Id. § 101.10 (Section 101.09 is deleted in the current version of the Code). 
228. Id. § 101.12 (Section 101.11 is deleted in the current version of the Code). 
229. Id. § 101.13. 
230. Id. § 101.14. 
231. Id. § 101.16. Pursuant to many state accounting authority rules, public accounting firms may 
not be wholly or majority owned by non-CPAs, and in some cases, a non-CPA may not even be a 
partner in such a firm. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 473.302(5) (West 2006); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 
7408 (McKinney 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4701.14 (LexisNexis 2006); TEX. OCC. CODE 
ANN. § 901.354 (Vernon 2005). A substantial portion of the rationale for CPA ownership and/or 
control of public accounting firms may be based on concerns over fraudulent use and 
misrepresentation of CPA credentials by non-CPAs. Accordingly, the AICPA’s direct prohibitions 
on non-CPA ownership and/or control reside in Rule 505, “Form of Organization and Name,” rather 
than in Rule 101, “Independence.” See CODE, supra note 211, § 505. 
232. This practice section of the AICPA counts as its members essentially all AICPA members 
that audit publicly held companies, because such members must be part of an SECPS member firm. 
SEC Practice Section (SECPS), http://www.aicpa.org/members/div/secps/index1.htm (last visited 
July 9th, 2006). There are currently 1,300 SECPS member firms. Id. Member firms are required to 
submit to peer review of their practices by other accountants as well as quality control inquiry to 
review audit failures alleged in litigation by SEC registrants against member firms. Questions and 
Answers About SECPS Peer Review http://www.aicpa.org/members/div/secps/faq/faq.htm (last 
visited July 9th, 2006); Requirements of Members, http://www.aicpa.org/members/div/secps/ 
require.htm (last visited July 9th, 2006). Additional membership requirements focus on 
improvements in the quality of audits and enhancement of auditor independence. Id. 
   233. About the POB, http://www.publicoversightboard.org/about.htm (last visited July 9th, 
2006). 
234. See id. The POB’s five members were primarily non-accountants, making it perhaps the 
most “independent” of the profession’s self-regulatory bodies, and it was primarily concerned with 
other aspects of statutory audits besides independence. See PUB. OVERSIGHT BD. ANN. REP., at 6 
(1996–1997). 
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POB became a focus of attention in the pre-Enron debates over auditor 
independence when, in 2000, the AICPA threatened to cut off funding 
for the POB’s planned special review of large SECPS member audit 
firms for compliance with SEC and professional auditor independence 
rules.235 The review had been requested in 1998 by then SEC Chairman 
Arthur Levitt,236 just as many observers were calling for a strengthened, 
more independent POB—with real authority over the SECPS and its 
members—as a central part of the solution for auditor independence 
problems.237 In response, the POB appointed an eight member Panel on 
Audit Effectiveness (Panel) to thoroughly examine the current statutory 
independent audit system.238 Despite surviving the funding scare of 
2000, the POB announced in January 2002 that it would terminate its 
existence no later than March 31 of that year in response to a proposal 
by the SEC, in consultation with the AICPA and the SECPS Executive 
Committee, to substantially revise the accounting profession’s self-
regulatory system—without input from the POB.239 Despite a request by 
then SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt for the POB to reconsider, the members 
of the POB asserted that continuing “would be against the interests of 
the public,” and that “it would mislead the public” for the POB to appear 
to still play a role in accountants’ regulation.240 
Even as the POB’s Panel on Audit Effectiveness was considering 
independence issues as part of its overall mandate, the SEC and AICPA 
also jointly created the ISB as a separate entity “to establish a conceptual 
framework to serve as the foundation for principles-based independence 
standards.”241 Eight members, serving on a part-time basis, comprised 
                                                     
235. See Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at the New York 
University Center for Law and Business: Renewing the Covenant with Investors (May 10, 2000). 
236. See Press Release, Pub. Oversight Bd., Panel on Audit Effectiveness Releases Exposure 
Draft (June 6, 2000). 
237. Editorial, When Financial Cops Turn Bad, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2000, at 6, available at 2000 
WLNR 8184565. 
238.  See Press Release, Pub. Oversight Bd., Panel on Audit Effectiveness Releases Exposure 
Draft (June 6, 2000). While the Chair of the Panel was Shaun F. O’Malley, former Chairman of 
Price Waterhouse LLP, the members were a mix of accountants and non-accountants. See id. The 
Panel issued a final report in 2000 which focused on non-audit services but offered no formal 
opinion as to whether any restrictions should be imposed. PUB. OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS (2000).  
239.  Press Release, Pub. Oversight Bd., Panel on Audit Effectiveness Releases Exposure Draft 
(Jan. 20, 2002). 
240. See Letter from Charles A. Bowsher, Chair of the Pub. Oversight Bd., to the Honorable 
Harvey L. Pitt, Chair of the U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n (Jan. 31, 2002). 
241. See Press Release, Independence Standards Bd., SEC Recognizes Authority of ISB to 
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the ISB: four were members of the public; three were senior partners of 
SECPS member firms; and one was to be either the President of the 
AICPA or his or her designee.242 William T. Allen, renowned former 
Chancellor of Delaware’s Court of Chancery, acted as the ISB’s 
Chairman, asserting that “systematic re-consideration” of auditor 
independence is “essential.”243 However, despite this and some other 
promising remarks by Allen which suggested that the ISB would start 
with a clean slate in considering new conceptual independence 
frameworks,244 the ISB immersed itself in the minutiae and paradigm of 
the current rules.245 The end result was that the ISB failed to provide a 
sorely needed fresh look at auditor independence.246 In any event, the 
ISB disbanded in 2001, ostensibly because it had “largely fulfilled its 
mission.”247 
2. SEC Independence Rules Before SOX 
Over time, the SEC’s default authority to define who is an 
“independent public accountant” allowed it to effectively regulate CPAs 
who wished to perform offering audits and/or the steady cash cow 
statutory audits—essentially all major accounting firms. But, as 
described in Part II.A. above, as statutory audits became a core service 
line for the major accounting firms, increasingly the latter found 
themselves providing substantial non-audit services to audit clients. 
This, coupled with the dramatic increase in the size and scope of non-
                                                     
Address Auditor Independence Questions (Feb. 19, 1998); see also SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, COMMISSION STATEMENT OF POLICY ON THE ESTABLISHMENT AND IMPROVEMENT 
OF STANDARDS RELATED TO AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE § I, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
policy/33-7507.htm. Neither the SEC nor the AICPA delegated any official rulemaking or other 
administrative capacity to the ISB, and the SEC was careful to establish that it retained all of its 
administrative powers with regard to definition and enforcement of regulations pertaining to auditor 
independence. See id. § II. 
242. See Independence Standards Bd., Operating Policies, art. 2. 
243. Press Release, Independence Standards Bd., SEC Recognizes Authority of ISB to Address 
Auditor Independence Questions (Feb. 19, 1998). 
244. See O’Connor, supra note 77, at 40–50. 
245. This might not be surprising, though, given that the ISB chose to “adopt[] as its guidance 
existing published SEC rules and interpretations.” Press Release, Independence Standards Bd., SEC 
Recognizes Authority of ISB to Address Auditor Independence Questions (Feb. 19, 1998). Further, 
the ISB may have felt such a stance was necessary to ensure SEC support of its endeavors. 
246. See O’Connor, supra note 77, at 40–50. 
247. Press Release, Independence Standards Bd., Independence Standards Board to Cease 
Operations After Making Major Contributions To The Resolution Of Difficult And Longstanding 
Auditor Independence Issues (July 17, 2001). 
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audit services and the ongoing periodic corporate accounting scandals 
cited in Section II.B.1, led the SEC to develop a complex set of rules 
codified in Regulation S-X with which CPA firms must comply if they 
want to be considered “independent” (SEC Independence Rules).248 
The SEC Independence Rules were substantially revised in late 2000 
after an extensive and controversial debate,249 but then modified again in 
2003 under the requirements of SOX.250 Even though SOX has much to 
say about auditor independence in the text of the statute itself, while also 
delegating significant auditor independence rulemaking authority to 
PCAOB,251 the SEC Independence Rules remain in effect. The term 
“independent public accountant” is still defined through an explanation 
based on the peculiar nature in which the SEC originally obtained its 
power to define the term: 
The [SEC] will not recognize an accountant as independent, 
with respect to an audit client, if the accountant is not, or a 
reasonable investor with knowledge of all relevant facts and 
circumstances would conclude that the accountant is not, 
capable of exercising objective and impartial judgment on all 
issues encompassed within the accountant’s engagement. In 
determining whether an accountant is independent, the [SEC] 
will consider all relevant circumstances, including all 
relationships between the accountant and the audit client, and 
not just those relating to reports filed with the [SEC].252 
Thus an accountant will not qualify as independent where he either (i) 
will in fact be biased in conducting the audit engagement or (ii) will be 
deemed to be biased by a “reasonable” informed investor. The latter 
reflects the sharp debate over inclusion of an “appearance” 
                                                     
248. The codification of these rules is at Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(b)–(c) (2004) and 
Codification of Financial Reporting Policies §§ 601–02, reprinted in SEC Accounting Rules (CCH) 
¶3872, at 3796. The Codification of Financial Reporting Policies is not intended to supplant the 
rules set forth in Regulation S-X, but is instead intended only to supplement those rules. 
249. One of the most contentious issues was the SEC’s initial proposal to drastically curtail the 
type and amount of non-audit services that could be provided to audit clients. See SEC Revision of 
the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements, Release Nos. 33-7919; 34-43602; 35-
27279; IC-24744; IA-1911; FR-56; File No. S7-13-00, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,008 (Dec. 5th, 2000) 
[hereinafter Final Rule] (amending 17 C.F.R. §§ 210, 240 (2000)).  
250. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(e) (2006); see also SEC Strengthening the Commission's 
Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence, Release No. 33-8183; 34-47265; 35-27642; IC-
25915; IA-2103, FR-68, File No. S7-49-02, 68 Fed. Reg. 6006 (Feb. 5th, 2003) (amending 17 CFR 
§§ 210, 240, 249, 274 (2002)).  
251. See infra Part II.B.3. 
252. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(b) (2006). 
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independence standard along with the accepted “factual” independence 
standard: is it enough that auditors in fact be independent even where 
they might appear otherwise?253 The SEC tried to introduce an 
“objective” appearance standard, based on the “reasonable investor” 
standard, because  
an auditor’s independence is impaired either when there is direct 
evidence of subjective bias, such as through a confession or 
some way of recording the auditor’s thoughts, or when, as in the 
ordinary case, the facts and circumstances as externally 
observed demonstrate, under an objective standard, that an 
auditor would not be capable of acting without bias.254  
Because this general definition of independence admits much 
interpretation, the SEC promulgated four guiding principles of 
interpretation as well as a non-exclusive compendium of actual 
applications of the general definition to specific circumstances255—an 
approach similar to the AICPA guidance on auditor independence. The 
four principles focus on whether an auditor’s relationship or provision of 
service:  
creates a mutual or conflicting interest between the accountant 
and the audit client; places the accountant in the position of 
auditing his or her own work; results in the accountant acting as 
management or an employee of the audit client; or places the 
accountant in a position of being an advocate for the audit 
client.256 
The non-exclusive compendium of specific examples or 
interpretations includes guidance on whether independence is impaired 
where: (i) the accountant257 has a “direct” or “material indirect” financial 
                                                     
253. See Final Rule, supra note 249, at IV.C.  
254. Id.  
255. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01, Preliminary Note. 
256. Id.  
257. For simplification, the term “accountant” is used in this paragraph to include “immediate 
family members,” 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(f)(13) (spouse, spousal equivalent, and dependents), and 
“covered persons,” 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.2-01(f)(11) (partners, principals, shareholders, and employees 
of the accountant’s firm who: (i) are on the audit engagement team; (ii) are in the chain of command 
over the accountant, the audit, or will exercise quality control or oversight over the audit; (iii) have 
performed ten or more hours of non-audit services to the audit client during the period covered by 
the audit engagement (up to the date when the accountant certifies the financial statements) or will 
perform ten or more hours of non-audit services to the audit client on a recurring basis; or (iv) are 
located in the firm’s office where the accountant primarily practices for purposes of the audit). 
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interest in the audit client;258 (ii) there is an employment relationship 
between the accountant and the audit client;259 (iii) the accountant has 
any direct or material indirect business relationships with the audit client 
or persons associated with the audit client in a decision-making 
capacity;260 (iv) the accountant or firm provides non-audit services to 
audit clients;261 (v) the accountant uses a contingent fee or commission 
payment structure such that the accountant’s financial interests are now 
linked with those of the audit client;262 (vi) the audit engagement partner 
is not rotated off from the audit client engagement at regular periodic 
intervals;263 (vii) audit or non-audit services for an audit client have not 
been pre-approved by the client’s audit committee;264 and (viii) 
individual auditors are compensated based on procuring non-audit 
services for the firm from an audit client.265 The SEC also included a 
safe harbor under the title of “quality controls.” Independence will not 
be deemed impaired where: (a) the accountant or related person did not 
know of the circumstances giving rise to the lack of independence; (b) 
the accountant’s or related person’s lack of independence was corrected 
as promptly as possible under the relevant circumstances upon 
awareness of the impaired independence; and (c) the accounting firm has 
a quality control system in place that provides reasonable assurance, 
taking into account the size and nature of the firm’s practice, that the 
firm and its employees do not lack independence.266 
                                                     
258. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(1). 
259. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(2). 
260. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(3). 
261. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(4). The SEC contemplated a near complete ban on such services, 
but then backed off this position for the final version of the current auditor independence rules. See 
Final Rule, supra note 249. Nonetheless, the following services will impair independence: (i) 
bookkeeping or other services related to the audit client’s accounting records or financial 
statements; (ii) financial information systems design and implementation; (iii) appraisal or valuation 
services, fairness opinions, or contribution-in-kind reports; (iv) actuarial services; (v) internal audit 
outsourcing services; (vi) management functions; (vii) human resources; (viii) broker-dealer, 
investment adviser, or investment banking services; (ix) legal services; and (x) expert services 
unrelated to the audit. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(4)(i)–(x). 
262. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(5). 
263. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(6). 
264. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(7). 
265. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(8). 
266. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(d). However, where the accounting firm provides audit, review, or 
attest services to more than 500 companies with a class of securities registered under the ‘34 Act, a 
quality control system will not fit within the safe harbor unless it includes the following: (i) written 
independence policies and procedures; (ii) an automated system with respect to partners and 
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3. Regulation of Auditors After SOX 
In the wake of Enron and the other corporate accounting disasters of 
the first few years of the 2000s, Congress hastily passed SOX.267 The 
legislation was widely touted by its proponents as “sweeping reform,” 
but some commentators were far more sanguine about it.268 Among 
many different sections of the law, a new regulatory mechanism for 
auditors was placed front and center. First, SOX created a new entity, 
PCAOB, that seems to have been modeled after the now defunct POB.269 
But PCAOB, as a statutory creation, arguably will have more clout and 
staying power than the POB.270 In particular, PCAOB is empowered to: 
(i) register public accounting firms that prepare audit reports for 
issuers;271 (ii) establish or adopt, or both, by rule, auditing, quality 
control, ethics, independence, and other standards relating to the 
preparation of audit reports for issuers;272 (iii) conduct inspections of 
registered public accounting firms;273 and (iv) conduct investigations and 
disciplinary proceedings concerning, and impose appropriate sanctions 
where justified upon, registered public accounting firms and associated 
persons of such firms.274 SOX also gives express oversight and 
enforcement authority over PCAOB to the SEC.275 
                                                     
managerial employees that identifies their investments in potentially independence impairing 
securities; (iii) a system that provides timely information, for all professionals, about entities from 
which accountants must maintain independence; (iv) an annual or ongoing, firm-wide training 
program about independence; (v) an annual internal inspection and testing program to monitor 
adherence to independence requirements; (vi) notification to all firm members, officers, directors, 
and employees of the name and title of the member of senior management responsible for 
compliance with independence requirements; (vii) written policies and procedures requiring that all 
partners and relevant persons report promptly to the firm when they become engaged in 
employment negotiations with an audit client, as well as that the firm immediately remove any such 
professional from that audit client’s audit engagement and promptly review all the work which the 
professional performed related to that engagement; and (viii) a disciplinary mechanism to ensure 
compliance with the independence rules outlined in the section. See id. 
267. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
268. See, e.g., generally Lawerence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, 
Light Reform (and It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003). 
269. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, tit. I, 116 Stat. 745. 
270. See id. § 101(a). 
271. Id. §§ 101(c), 102. 
272. Id. §§ 101(c), 103. 
273. Id. §§ 101(c), 104. 
274. Id. §§ 101(c), 105. 
275. Id. § 107. 
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Second, SOX amends both the ‘33 Act and the ‘34 Act. Pursuant to 
the former, it enhances the SEC’s authority to establish, authorize, or 
adopt generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) for reporting 
under that Act.276 Pursuant to the latter, it specifically prohibits certain 
services that registered public accounting firms can provide to audit 
clients.277 In particular, SOX added subsection (g) to § 10A of the ‘34 
Act, which prohibits the provision to the audit client of: (i) bookkeeping 
or accounting services; (ii) financial information systems design; (iii) 
appraisal or valuation services, including fairness opinions; (iv) actuarial 
services; (v) internal audit outsourcing services; (vi) management 
functions or human resources; (vii) broker or dealer, investment adviser, 
or investment banking services; (viii) legal services and expert services 
not related to the audit; or (ix) any other service that PCAOB 
determines, by regulation, to be impermissible.278 This list looks 
suspiciously like the list of prohibited independence-impairing activities 
in the SEC Independence Rules, but not because the SEC’s rules arose in 
the wake of the passage of SOX. Instead, these restrictions were largely 
in place by the 2000 revision of the SEC Independence Rules.279 Thus, 
this is one reason why I believe that SOX delivered a little less than 
meets the eye. 
But was there any substantive purpose behind elevating restrictions 
already largely existing in the 2000 version of the SEC Independence 
Rules to the level of statutory law? Some might argue that it increases 
the enforcement potential of the rules—indeed probably the main reason 
to make this move. When the list was only part of rules regarding 
independence impairing activities, it meant only that if an auditor was 
found to have provided those services, then the auditor would not be 
accepted as independent for purposes of certifying the client’s annual 
report as part of the statutory audit.280 This was bad, but did not 
necessarily bring any penalties and no law had been violated. But with 
the new statutory codification of the list, any provision of the prohibited 
activities to an audit client would be a violation of the ‘34 Act, as 
amended.281 Plus, SOX brought audit firms that perform statutory audits 
                                                     
276. Id. § 108. 
277. Id. tit. II. 
278. Id. § 201(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1 (West Supp. 2006)).  
279. The 2000 SEC Auditor Independence Rules includes everything in this list except: the 
“expert services not related to the audit” part of (viii). See Final Rule, supra note 249.   
280. See Final Rule, supra note 249, at 1–3; see also O’Connor, supra note 77, at 10. 
281. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1.  
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directly under the government’s regulatory authority (through PCAOB 
and registration requirements),282 rather than the indirect regulation 
available before SOX through the SEC’s power to define “independent 
public accountants.” 
SOX did add some truly new provisions to the offering and statutory 
audit relationship, in addition to the existing SEC Independence Rules 
that it elevated to the level of statutory law. First, as the impetus for one 
of the newly added independence impairing activities in the 2003 
version of the SEC Independence Rules, auditors must receive pre-
approval by the client’s audit committee for any audit or non-audit 
services.283 Second, and corresponding to another addition in the 2003 
version of the SEC Independence Rules, audit partners must rotate off 
the audit engagement every five years.284 Third, but this time not 
corresponding directly to anything currently in the SEC Independence 
Rules, auditors must prepare reports regarding execution of the offering 
and/or statutory audit and submit them directly to the client’s audit 
committee.285 And fourth, corresponding in part to an item in the SEC 
Independence Rules, an auditor may not perform a statutory audit for a 
client where any C-level executive or controller of the client was an 
employee of the auditor prior to the audit engagement and participated in 
any capacity in a statutory audit of that client occurring within the 
preceding year.286 
A final relevant change imposed by SOX is codification of mandatory 
listing requirements to be implemented by national securities exchanges 
and associations, especially around the rules for audit committees of 
listed companies.287 The main thrust here seems to be that a proper audit 
committee, including “independent” directors/committee members, is 
required to link up with the other new SOX requirement that auditors 
report directly to such committees. 
All in all, there is a certain admirable quality to SOX’s drafters’ 
attempt to nail down auditor independence rules once and for all, make 
them truly enforceable, and mandate that properly constituted audit 
committees of the issuer control the statutory audit relationship with the 
                                                     
282.  See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 202–206, 116 Stat. 745 (codified 
at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1). 
283. Id. § 202 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1). 
284. Id. § 203 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1). 
285. Id. § 204 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1). 
286. Id. § 206 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1). 
287. Id. § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1). 
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auditor. But, at the same time, this just seems to be the latest incredibly 
complicated mechanism to force agents such as auditors to live up to the 
impossible task of serving many masters and essentially acting against 
their interest in serving the company as client rather than shareholders 
and an investing public that they have no contact with. 
In sum, this Part has documented the dramatic changes in the 
accounting profession following the passage of the federal securities 
laws in the 1930s and the concomitant ever-growing bramble bush of 
auditor independence rules and interpretations promulgated by different 
regulatory bodies to keep pace. Of course, this Article argues that this 
tangled nest of rules exists primarily because the mistaken creation of 
the statutory audit, in particular, put auditors in an untenable position 
serving many masters, while being controlled (e.g., hired, fired, and 
paid) by the party that is in fact the agent to be audited. The next Part, 
then, outlines a proposal to remedy the problem by three interdependent 
changes that in tandem would dramatically strengthen auditor 
independence by reducing or even possibly eliminating the need for it. 
III. REDUCING THE NEED FOR INDEPENDENCE: REALIGNING 
AUDITORS AND THEIR CLIENTS 
This Article has thus far laid out a number of different events over 
time that, taken together, have made meaningful auditor independence 
impossible. Section A of this last Part of the Article brings all of these 
strands together to establish why auditor independence under the current 
system is impossible. Section B then proposes a tripartite solution whose 
components necessarily need to work in tandem to reestablish audits as 
the effective control and premium signaling mechanisms that they were 
intended to be. 
A. The Impossibility of Auditor Independence Under the Current System 
In United States v. Arthur Young & Co.,288 the Supreme Court 
outlined the bind auditors find themselves in as a result of the statutory 
audit system: 
                                                     
288. 465 U.S. 805 (1984). The issue in this case was whether auditor work-product related to 
assessment of the adequacy of a corporation’s financial reserves set aside for contingent tax 
liabilities was immune to a disclosure request by the IRS during an investigation of the corporation. 
See id. at 807–08. The Court held that no such immunity—which it considered tantamount to an 
accountant-client privilege, itself already denied by the Court in Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 
322 (1973)—existed. See Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 817–21.  
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By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a 
corporation’s financial status, the independent auditor assumes a 
public responsibility transcending any employment relationship 
with the client. The independent public accountant performing 
this special function owes ultimate allegiance to the 
corporation’s creditors and stockholders, as well as to the 
investing public. This “public watchdog” function demands that 
the accountant maintain total independence from the client at all 
times and requires complete fidelity to the public trust.289 
In essence, the Court is noting that the auditor stands in a quasi-
fiduciary relationship with the public. Such a heightened sense of duty 
on the part of the auditor may be beneficial, but the question remains, 
who is the client? Further, are stockholders’ and creditors’ interests 
regarding a certain company always aligned? If not, who gets the greater 
allegiance of the auditor? Agents cannot serve two masters, at least not 
faithfully.290 And, finally, does it even make sense to talk of the interest 
of the “investing public” as if it were of single mind and unitary interest? 
There may be times when the interests of current shareholders—say, to 
maintain the value of their shares in the secondary market—are contrary 
to the interests of potential shareholders—say, to have the most accurate 
information about the company to determine whether to buy its shares in 
the secondary market.291 Regardless, the questions raised by the 
responsibility of the auditor to the public remain. 
When courts have focused on questions of auditor liability to third 
parties, outside of the regulatory context of the statutory audit under 
federal law, most have rejected open-ended negligence liability to ill-
defined sets of third party beneficiaries such as prospective investors or 
the “investing public.”292 But this exact kind of open-ended liability to 
                                                     
289. Id. at 817–18. 
290. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate and Securities Law 
After Enron, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 449 (2002) (quoting Justice Harlan Stone, “I venture to assert 
that when the history of the financial era which has just drawn to a close comes to be written, most 
of its mistakes and its major faults will be ascribed to the failure to observe the fiduciary principle, 
the precept as old as holy writ, that ‘a man cannot serve two masters.’”).  
291. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Temporal Perspectives: Resolving the Conflict Between 
Current and Future Investors, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1044 (2004–2005); see also William W. Bratton, 
Shareholder Value and Auditor Independence, 53 DUKE L.J. 439, 452–62 (2003–2004); O’Connor, 
supra note 77, at 66–68.  
292. See generally Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931); Bily v. Arthur 
Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 746–47 (Cal. 1992). Besides New York and California, eleven other 
states appear to have adopted the privity approach: Alabama, Idaho, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, 
Arkansas, Illinois, Kansas, Utah, Delaware, Colorado, and Indiana. Bily, 834 P.2d at 755. Three 
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an ill-defined “investing public” is essentially what the statutory audit 
imposes on auditors. As I have written elsewhere, Congress and the SEC 
needed to deputize someone to help them monitor the stock offerings 
and financial disclosures of new and existing reporting companies—
accountants more or less applied for the job and got it.293 Yet, as one 
commentator has colorfully entitled an article on the subject, 
“Accountants Make Miserable Policemen,”294 and they seem to have 
vastly underestimated the dimensions of what they took on, especially in 
regard to the statutory audit.295 
In exchange for this new public trust, the accounting profession 
received a franchise of mandatory annual audit work that was nearly as 
good as an annuity. But what few, if any, focused on at the time was that 
the statutory audit was now a commodity. Where even their clients did 
not fully internalize this new state of affairs, it slowly became clear to 
both auditors and the management of their clients that the only things 
that really mattered were price and the ability of the auditor to handle the 
size and complexity of the audit.296 The size issue was not negligible, 
and seems to have provided a counterweight that slowed—but did not 
stop—the slide into commodification of the audit.297 Arguably, the 
statutory audit, combined with the remarkable growth of larger U.S. 
companies in the middle of the twentieth century, set up a competition 
where only those accounting firms that could grow quickly enough, and 
do so without losing all quality controls in the process, survived to audit 
those companies. This may be part of the story of the emergence of the 
Big Eight. It certainly seems to be a big part of the story in the continued 
consolidation of the profession in the 1980s and 1990s which resulted in 
                                                     
states—New Jersey, Wisconsin, and Mississippi—appear to have adopted a foreseeability rule that 
would find negligence liability for essentially an unlimited class of plaintiffs, so long as those 
plaintiffs’ use of the audit report, whether directly or derivatively, was foreseeable by the auditor. 
Id. at 755–57. A third, compromise approach follows Section 552 of the Restatement Second of 
Torts by allowing for negligence liability to third parties who were clearly intended to benefit from 
the audit report. Id. at 757–59. Under the Restatement approach, general public annual audits do not 
create negligence liability to third parties. Id. at 758. Seventeen states are claimed to follow this 
approach: Tennessee, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New 
Hampshire, Ohio, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, Louisiana, Kentucky, North Dakota, and 
Rhode Island.  Id. at 758–59. 
293. O’Connor, supra note 77, at 8. 
294. Jerry W. Markham, Accountants Make Miserable Policemen: Rethinking the Federal 
Securities Laws, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 725 (2003). 
295. Id.; see also O’Connor, supra note 1, at 822–27. 
296. See supra Parts I.B, II.A; see also Macey & Sale, supra note 77, at 1167–70. 
297. See supra Parts I.B, II.A; see also Macey & Sale, supra note 77, at 1167–70. 
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the Big Five.298 The open question is whether the current situation—in 
which only four firms have the capacity to audit large companies, and in 
which traditional economic metrics indicate a strong potential for market 
power—will finally tip the scales against the commodifying tendency of 
the statutory audit franchise. After all, government franchises can be 
extremely valuable if given exclusively to only one or two parties. 
Further complicating matters, the Big Four seem to have significant 
“feed the beast” issues with regard to demanding high work and revenue 
flow just to maintain the enormous payrolls and overhead needed to 
perform audits for the largest companies. Coupled with the problem that 
large issuers may also wind up being one of a few, or even the only, 
clients for any particular audit engagement partner, the deal flow issue 
makes “auditor capture”—where the auditor treats management rather 
than shareholders or the investing public as the true 
client/beneficiary/principal—a very real threat.299 Of course, under the 
current regulatory system, issuers do not have an entirely free hand to 
fire, or even threaten to fire, their auditors. As Professor Coffee has 
pointed out, changes or even just disputes with auditors must be reported 
by issuers in their mandatory periodic disclosure documents to the SEC, 
which are then made publicly available in the EDGAR system.300 Thus, 
one could infer that any such events become public information which 
can tend to spook the markets for the issuer’s securities.301 
But Coffee’s real insight in this area was that issuers could use the 
promise of granting (or alternatively the threat of withholding) lucrative 
non-audit services to influence the auditor without ever disagreeing with 
him over the statutory audit or threatening to fire him from the audit.302 
Thus, one might argue that the recent spin-offs and restructurings of Big 
Four consulting divisions are a win for the auditor and independence. 
However, a large number of non-audit advisory and consulting services 
remain within the accounting, audit, and tax divisions of these firms. For 
example, this was true of the Arthur Andersen Business Consulting 
group within the former Arthur Andersen LLP—post Andersen-
                                                     
298. See GAO STUDY, supra note 140, at 12–15. 
299. O’Connor, supra note 77, at 50–52; Macey & Sale, supra note 77, at 1167–70. 
300. Coffee, supra note 74, at 1411. 
301. Id. 
302. Id. 
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Consulting divorce. Given the profitability and panache of consulting 
services it may be hard for the Big Four to stay away from them.303 
Additionally, the Big Four very much operate in an international 
arena.304 Accordingly, much of the Big Four’s growth in non-audit 
services before 2000 was driven by different regulatory and client 
expectation environments overseas. Thus, while the United States is 
undoubtedly one of the largest markets for the Big Four, these firms 
cannot exclusively focus on either the legal/regulatory system or the 
professional services marketplace here. Indeed some of the regulatory 
problems that the major firms have faced over the past decade or so may 
stem from focusing too much on the practice environments in other 
countries, or perhaps on the sort of hubris that sometimes develops 
within those who consider themselves “transnational” and thus largely 
above any particular jurisdiction’s rules. 
All of the foregoing suggest that the commodified audit may be with 
us for a while. But a commodified statutory audit—as a high volume, 
pure price competition business—seems a poor choice for an investor 
protection device. In short, the problem is that there is neither an 
incentive towards costly quality control measures, nor an appropriate 
level of focus on serving the interests of the intended third party 
beneficiaries such as shareholders and the investing public at large. 
Therefore, “independence” appears to be a countervailing rhetorical and 
regulatory device to try to enforce the profession’s side of the bargain in 
which they received the statutory audit franchise. The more challenges it 
faces, though, the more band-aids rather than real solutions seem to be 
applied in response. 
While at the ISB,305 Professor Allen noted the instrumental value of 
independence. Prior to the introduction of the concept of independence 
in the ‘33 Act, its constituent components of objectivity and integrity 
were valued primarily for their role in the fiduciary obligations that 
accountants were expected to fulfill to their paying clients.306 These 
profession-imposed duties can be illuminated by hypothetical examples 
from professional relationships in other fields. Objectivity would exist 
                                                     
303. Jopson, supra note 184, at 15. Deloitte, of course, still has its consulting division intact 
within the firm. See Deloitte Consulting Home Page, http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/section_node/ 
0,1042,sid%253D26551,00.html (last visited July 9, 2006); Deloitte Consulting LLP, HOOVER’S IN-
DEPTH COMPANY RECORDS, 2006 WLNR 5445788 (Apr. 1, 2006). 
304.  GAO STUDY, supra note 140, at 13–15. 
305. See supra note 243 and accompanying text. 
306. See supra Part I. 
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for doctors and lawyers where the professional does not have interests 
adverse to accurately assessing the patient/client’s actual medical or 
legal situation. Integrity would exist for doctors and lawyers where the 
professional resists the pressures of these conflicting interests where 
they do exist. “Independence” per se is unnecessary or irrelevant in these 
examples for two reasons. First, a client/patient is unlikely to hire a 
professional whom he believes to have a strong alliance with an 
individual or organization whose interests are adverse to his own.307 
Second, in the traditional professional services environment where 
doctors are simply doctors, lawyers simply lawyers, and accountants 
simply accountants, the “reputational capital” of the professional should 
be based on the public’s belief that the professional acts with objectivity 
and integrity. Professionals who engage in reputation-depleting activities 
will likely find themselves with few clients over time, regardless of their 
“independence.” 
Thus it is telling that a theory of “independence” had to be introduced 
by the drafters of the federal securities laws in the first place. This 
suggests that the normal reputational capital market was somehow 
inadequate for the statutory audit system. The risks that reputational 
intermediaries incur through their activities include diminishment of 
their established reputations and lawsuits brought by third parties who 
relied on their assurances about a particular client.308 The liability of the 
reputational intermediary for the client’s acts gives credibility to the 
client, because the market believes that the reputational intermediary 
would only take on this risk if it was assured of its client’s credibility.309 
In light of perceived failures of this theory, however, a number of 
commentators have advanced criticisms.310 First, as discussed above, 
                                                     
307. This is underscored in the concerns over managed care where patients fear that their doctors 
are constrained by the HMO’s rules in care decisions. 
308. See Choi, supra note 74, at 916–17; Gilson, supra note 74, at 289–90; Kraakman, 
Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, supra note 74, at 53–54; 
Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, supra note 74, at 292–
99. 
309. See Choi, supra note 74, at 916–17; Gilson, supra note 74, at 289–90; Kraakman, 
Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, supra note 74, at 53–54; 
Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, supra note 74, at 292–
99. 
310. See Coffee, supra note 74, at 1405; John C. Coffee, The Acquiescent Gatekeeper: 
Reputational Intermediaries, Auditor Independence and the Governance of Accounting 10–14 (The 
Ctr. for Law and Econ. Studies, Columbia Law Sch., Working Paper No. 191, 2001), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=270944; Brian W. Mayhew, Jeffrey W. Schatzberg & Galen R. Sevcik, The 
Effect of Accounting Uncertainty and Auditor Reputation on Auditor Objectivity, AUDITING J. PRAC. 
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accountants appear to have engaged in reputation-depleting activities to 
a degree not predicted by the theory.311 One study notes that in a world 
of unambiguous accounting rules, accountants may in fact remain 
objective to enhance their reputation with managers and investors; yet in 
the world that we inhabit, ambiguous accounting rules lead accountants 
away from objectivity despite the damage to their reputations.312 Second, 
the effect of ambiguous accounting rules may be compounded by: (i) the 
opaque nature of accounting and the audit process; (ii) collusion among 
auditors, management, and even the audit committee; and (iii) the 
divergence of audit firm interests and individual audit partner interests 
(e.g., the firm holds the reputational capital in the marketplace while the 
engagement partner’s compensation and advancement rely on big fees 
and cross-selling services).313 Thus, the engagement partner—who 
controls audit quality—may perceive relatively little risk in reputation-
depleting activities because the firm will bear most of the reputation 
costs in the marketplace.314 Further, the incentives to please the audit 
client are magnified by firm reward structures which may outweigh 
whatever individual reputation risk the auditor may perceive.315 Third, 
the increased difficulty in obtaining judgments against individual audit 
partners or their firms316 has reduced further the perceived risk to 
auditors for lapses of objectivity and integrity.317 
                                                     
THEORY, Sept. 2001, at 49; O’Connor, supra note 1, at 788; O’Connor, supra note 77, at 65–67; see 
generally Partnoy, supra note 74; Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A 
Behavioral Insight Into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 133, 219 (2000); Choi, 
supra note 74, at 916–17. 
311. See generally Mayhew, Schatzberg & Sevcik, supra note 310. 
312. See id. 
313. See Coffee, The Acquiescent Gatekeeper: Reputational Intermediaries, Auditor 
Independence and the Governance of Accounting, supra note 310, at 10–14. 
314. See id.; see also Macey & Sale, supra note 77, at 1169–72; Partnoy, supra note 74, at 528–
35. 
315. See Macey & Sale, supra note 77, at 1169–72. Of course, an audit partner cannot act so 
egregiously that the firm is forced to fire him regardless of the fees and services he brings in, as in 
the case of David Duncan as the audit engagement partner at Arthur Andersen for Enron. 
316. The increased difficulty to obtain judgments against auditors stems from legislation such as 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737. But of 
course, such judgments are not impossible. Consider the case of Duncan and Arthur Andersen. See 
supra, note 315. 
317. See Coffee, The Acquiescent Gatekeeper: Reputational Intermediaries, Auditor 
Independence and the Governance of Accounting, supra note 310, at 11; see also Partnoy, supra 
note 74, at 528–35. 
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Reputational capital may, figuratively speaking, be like other capital. 
That is, properly invested it can generate interest on the principal. If so, 
one could imagine that firms with sufficient reputational capital could 
afford to engage in reputation depleting activities without suffering harm 
in the market. So long as these activities only deplete “interest,” the 
principal is not diminished.318 To stretch this simile even further, one 
could envision this “interest” as the extra goodwill that comes with 
market dominance: simply being at the top enhances a firm’s reputation 
regardless of its current activities.319 
Perhaps most important, the Young court’s interpretation of the 
statutory audit system is at odds with the reputational intermediary 
theory because the intended beneficiaries of the statutory audit—existing 
shareholders, creditors, and potential investors—do not have a role in 
choosing the auditor. The auditor has to be primarily concerned with his 
reputation among those who directly hire and fire him. This led to the 
traditional conflict between the interests of management and 
shareholders in hiring auditors. Generally speaking, management tends 
to seek auditors who will approve the financial statements prepared by 
it,320 while shareholders would like to know what is really going on.321 
Attempts to bridge this gap, such as shifting control of the audit 
relationship to audit committees and introducing shareholder ratification 
of outside auditors, may be helping. But, as evidenced by ongoing 
corporate accounting crises such as the recent meltdown at Refco in 
which auditors seem complicit,322 these reforms have not cured the 
problems. First, while shifting control of the audit to an audit committee 
comprised of outside directors, as required under SOX,323 seems like a 
                                                     
318. This theory seems supported by the story of Arthur Andersen in that even after a number of 
SEC enforcement actions and fines, together with the negative publicity that these generated, the 
firm still maintained its prestigious reputation. It finally took a federal criminal indictment to burn 
through the substantial amounts of “interest” that Andersen had accrued over its decades as a major 
accounting firm. But once this happened, the “principal” was spent down quickly as well and the 
firm collapsed as clients finally began fleeing in droves. 
319. This is similar to the intuition that Federal Express, for example, generates substantial 
goodwill and customers just from being so visible and dominant in the overnight delivery market. 
320. Coffee, supra note 74, at 1413–14. 
321. Although, as noted above, sometimes shareholders may have as much interest as 
management in presenting a favorable but inaccurate picture of the company to the public to 
maintain share value in the secondary market. 
322. See Riva D. Atlas & Jonathan D. Glater, Mystery at Refco: How Could Such a Huge Debt 
Stay Hidden?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2005, at C1. 
323. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 202, 116 Stat. 745. 
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good way to take control of the audit away from the corporate insiders 
being monitored by the audit, there are serious problems with the model 
of outside directors as both good directors and proxies for 
shareholders.324 Second, auditor ratification is a limited reform both 
because the shareholders are still restricted to withholding votes for the 
audit committee’s choice of auditors and because the audit relationship 
will still be managed by the audit committee. 
In the end, the misalignment of interests and the commodified 
statutory audit place too much of a burden on the dubious construct of 
“independence.” Paradoxically, this construct could be incrementally 
helpful in a better aligned premium service audit system, because 
“independence” can be a useful proxy for the normal agent attributes we 
seek of objectivity and integrity. Or, at the very least, as mentioned at 
the outset of this Article, one certainly does not want an agent/auditor 
who is dependent on the very individuals or entities that she has been 
hired to audit. Thus, at the margins, one is always looking to ensure that 
one’s agent/auditor is independent of the individuals and entities that she 
is supposed to audit. But it is wholly inadequate in the current audit 
system where in so many ways the auditors have been captured by the 
parties they are supposed to be auditing and are therefore clearly 
dependent on those parties. Accordingly, auditor independence is simply 
impossible under the current system. 
B. A Tripartite Solution 
The review I have undertaken thus far sets the stage for a fresh 
approach that could finally take us out of this morass once and for all. 
By tracing key developments in the history of auditing and its regulation, 
some interesting turning points were revealed which suggest that the 
road not taken might have been better. Because we cannot turn back the 
clock and undo these decisions, we must instead consider second-best 
ways of remedying the problems resulting from these missteps. This 
Article concludes by arguing for three interrelated changes to statutory 
and regulatory law that, if implemented together, could effect such a 
remedy. Namely, the SEC should rescind the statutory audit, 
shareholders should be given control of an audit primarily for their 
benefit, and the regulation of accountants should be unified or 
harmonized. 
                                                     
324. See, e.g., BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 73, at 13–15. 
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1. Dismantling the Statutory Audit 
Public annual audits have not prevented any of the rashes of corporate 
scandals over the decades—whether those of the 1920s, when audits 
were a voluntary best practice, or those occurring even after the passage 
of SOX.325 On the other hand, private audit rights and related 
information and control rights such as those negotiated by venture 
capital funds appear to work to the reasonable satisfaction of those kinds 
of shareholders.326 At the same time, companies are tending to remain 
either privately held, or to return actively to privately held status because 
of the increasing burdens and liabilities placed on publicly held 
companies by the securities laws.327 Thus, the benefits of the statutory 
audit may be largely illusory—even as the cost of compliance, both in 
dollars spent and the moral hazard presented to “captured” independent 
auditors, is substantial. 
As established above, the statutory audit requirement was somewhat 
of a historical accident based on a hopeful, yet uncompleted, 
federalization of corporation law. The Roosevelt Administration wanted 
to replace the crazy quilt of state corporations law with a uniform federal 
system—modeled after the Companies Act, 1929—that might better 
support a rapidly mobilizing nation with increasing interstate commerce 
and ties.328 The ‘33 Act, and to a lesser extent the ‘34 Act, were 
considered to be the opening salvos in the necessary barrage of 
legislation to achieve this goal. Thus, it was perhaps seen as little matter 
that a great many provisions of the Companies Act, 1929, including their 
audit provisions, were to be lifted out of their comprehensive and 
                                                     
325. See Markham, supra note 294, at 794–99; supra Part I. Note that non-audit services still 
permitted after SOX continue to land some of the Big Four firms in hot water, such as KPMG’s 
recent brush-up with the Justice Department over its seriously flawed tax shelter practice. Floyd 
Norris, When Auditors Go Astray, What Director Dares Say So?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2005. 
326. See, e.g., Richard J. Testa, Venture Capital Financing, in 1 MASSACHUSETTS BUSINESS 
LAWYERING 13-1, 13-15–16, 13-18–20 (Stanley Keller, ed., 1991); Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a 
Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1081–83 
(2003). Some commentators argue, however, that these private audits have higher transaction costs 
for the very reason that they do have to be individually negotiated. See Hepp & Mayhew, supra note 
39, at 12–22. 
327. See generally Ehud Kamar, Pinar Karacha-Mandic & Eric Talley, Going-Private Decisions 
and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Cross-Country Analysis (Law and Econ. Workshop, U. Cal., 
Berkeley, Paper No. 12, 2005), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/berkeley_law_econ/ 
fall2005/12 (finding that predicted exit of firms from capital markets due to increased costs of 
compliance with SOX held true for small firms but not for large firms). 
328. See supra Part I.A. 
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coherent original context and dumped into narrow legislation taking on 
only the securities issuing part of companies and their regulation. 
Further, it is interesting to note that when the federal tax laws were 
passed, some accountants considered whether to petition the Treasury 
Department to require attestation of income tax returns by accountants 
on behalf of filers.329 However, nothing ultimately came of this.330 
Today, it seems quite natural that neither individuals nor companies 
need hire an accountant to certify their tax return. In fact, the developed 
practice is quite different in that accountants, when hired to do taxes, are 
very much seen as the taxpayer’s advocate, trying to find her the best tax 
profile resulting in a lower tax bill (or higher refund). We could have set 
up our securities system this same way, with accountants simply 
assisting their clients to prepare and submit annual reports on Form 10-K 
to the SEC. The SEC could then have been given the power to initiate 
investigative or forensic audits where it had suspicions about a filer’s 
report. 
The underlying theme is that auditors cannot faithfully act on behalf 
of “many masters” any more than any other agents can.331 This is acutely 
true where the interests of the different masters are contrary to one 
another. For example, compare the prospective investor who likely 
wants to know the most pessimistic outlook for the company before 
investing with the existing investor who instead likely wants the most 
optimistic outlook so as to inflate the company’s stock price to its 
loftiest levels.332 The end result is an auditor with seriously conflicted 
agency issues. Likewise, different investors might have different risk 
profiles, investment time horizons, and status regarding the company 
(e.g., manager, employee, creditor, director, shareholder).333 For 
Professor Bratton, this means that perhaps an agency framework is 
simply the wrong way to go about fixing the audit system.334 He argues 
that any sort of relational framework jeopardizes independence, and he 
may be right on that score. But he may also have the wrong end of the 
                                                     
329. O’Connor, supra note 1, at 784–85 (citing JOHN L. CAREY, THE RISE OF THE ACCOUNTING 
PROFESSION: FROM TECHNICIAN TO PROFESSIONAL 1896–1936, at 215–16 (1969)). 
330. Id.  
331. See generally Seligman, supra note 290. 
332. See generally Schwarcz, supra note 291. 
333. See Bratton, supra note 291, at 452–62. 
334. Id. at 485–89. 
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stick in that he often sounds as if he believes that independence is an end 
in itself.335 
I tend to side with Professor Allen’s instrumentalist view of 
independence.336 As such, I would rather chuck independence than try to 
shore it up by tossing an agency approach overboard. Like Bob Dylan 
sang, you “gotta serve somebody,”337 and so long as audits are provided 
on any other basis than as a gift, agency issues will arise as the auditor 
will be serving someone. Even Consumer Reports serves its 
constituency, as do government agencies (hence the name). Accordingly, 
the audit must be conceived of as an agency relationship.338 Thus, the 
primary question is how best to align the parties’ interests to maximize 
their benefit while, at the same time, acknowledging that this account of 
the audit relationship does not have to be a pure agency story: other 
interests can be taken into account to some degree. 
Dismantling the statutory audit and replacing it with an audit right 
directly controlled by the shareholders339 provides the best option for 
addressing the inherent conflicts presented by the independent audit. The 
rationale for doing so is multi-faceted. First, removing the annual 
statutory audit makes sense because it eliminates serious conflict of 
interest issues on the part of the auditor. Such a conflict exists, in part, 
because of the possibly diverging interests of potential and current 
shareholders, and in part, because of the close relationship that develops 
over the years between auditor and client—including the independence 
impairing substantial (yet low margin) annual revenues from such an 
audit.340 
Second, the general purpose audit, such as that required by the 
statutory audit, is simply not a very effective device. By design, it is 
most emphatically not a forensic or investigative audit, but rather 
primarily ensures that the audited company’s financial statements are 
                                                     
335. Although I do not think that is what he really means. 
336. For a fuller discussion of Professor Allen’s views after he left the ISB, see generally William 
T. Allen & Arthur Siegel, Threats and Safeguards in the Determination of Auditor Independence, 
80 WASH. U. L.Q. 519 (2002). 
337. BOB DYLAN, Gotta Serve Somebody, on SLOW TRAIN COMING (Columbia Records 1979). 
338. Placement of auditors into a theoretical agency framework goes back to at least the 1980s. 
See generally Rick Antle, Auditor Independence, 22 J. ACCT. RES. 1 (1984); Rick Antle, The 
Auditor as an Economic Agent, 20 J. ACCT. RES. 503 (1982). 
339. See infra Part III.B.2. 
340. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The Financial Statement Insurance 
Alternative to Auditor Liability, 52 UCLA L. REV. 413, 418–19 (2004); Macey & Sale, supra note 
77, at 1169, 1177–78. 
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internally consistent and that they seem to correspond to actual fiscal 
health, as determined by statistical analysis based on limited 
investigations of corporate records.341 Auditors use statistical sampling 
of actual records of corporate transactions to essentially “spot check” the 
financial statements prepared by management against the original 
records of underlying transactions or perhaps actual assets or inventory 
on hand.342 Auditors do not examine each and every underlying record 
or asset.343 Accordingly, employees or management who are intent on 
defrauding creditors or shareholders have the opportunity to take steps to 
minimize the chance that the auditor will detect the fraud. That being 
said, there seems to be a bit of the information technology world’s 
maxim of “garbage in, garbage out” to the audit process as well: the 
quality of answer that one gets from an audit may well depend on the 
kind and quality of the question asked.344 Thus, in true investigative or 
forensic audits, the auditor is seeking evidence to answer a specific 
question. For example, did a particular manager improperly record 
certain transactions? In the end, auditors are put into a position where 
they may look less competent than they are because they are restricted to 
a relatively superficial audit in the statutory audit process despite 
possessing the capability to perform much more hard hitting audits such 
as those used in investigative or forensic audit engagements. 
Third, removing the audit could help reduce the widespread 
misperception that registered issuers and their securities have been given 
some kind of government seal of approval. Obviously, this is not the 
case given our disclosure-based, rather than merits review-based, federal 
securities system.345 Yet, even where investors understand that the 
issuer’s securities have not been approved for the soundness of the 
investment by the SEC, there is still a concern that the statutory audit, 
combined with the overall disclosure via the SEC, somehow puts the 
government’s imprimatur on at least the disclosure and audit.346 Going 
back to the second reason for dismantling the statutory audit given in the 
preceding paragraph, the SEC’s requirement of the statutory audit may 
                                                     
341. Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 31 (2002); Markham, supra note 294, at 795–99; Bily 
v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 749–50 (Cal. 1992). 
342. Bily, 834 P.2d at 749–50. 
343. Id. 
344. See Hepp & Mayhew, supra note 39, at 5–7; Markham, supra note 294, at 796–98. 
345. O’Connor, supra note 1, at 797–98. 
346. Markham, supra note 294, at 771–72, 798–99, 808. 
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signal to some that the audit is more effective than it really is in assuring 
that a company’s financial statements accurately portray the fiscal state 
of the issuer.347 In an era where even mandatory disclosure is a topic for 
debate,348 the certification requirement for that disclosure seems even 
more ripe for reconsideration. 
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, the dismantling of the statutory 
audit would realign the normal agency incentives and relationships in 
private audits. Such removal would also allow the chance for the 
experiment in a true reputational intermediary marketplace to unfold. If 
the theories about reputational intermediaries are correct, then why 
would we not want to free those markets from the unnatural restraints of 
the current commodified statutory audit? As an added bonus, such a 
move would likely save countless amounts of money heretofore spent on 
counterproductive audits which do not clearly benefit anyone—that is, 
audits with effectively no limited target audience. Either a real market 
for premium signaling audits would develop, or their inability to expose 
serious accounting issues would become known and we would be 
commenting, along with Senator Gore, that, “[w]e have had all this 
debacle here in spite of that.”349 
Finally, on a technical implementation note, this part of the solution 
may be the easiest to achieve. Congress has never codified the statutory 
audit (as opposed to the offering audit which is right in the text of the 
‘33 Act). Thus, the SEC could simply rescind its regulation that annual 
reports under the ‘34 Act be certified by a registered public accountant. 
This could make heads explode, because the entire edifice of Regulation 
S-X and SOX have been erected in large part on the foundation of the 
statutory audit. But note that I am not arguing for removal of the offering 
audit—which would require an act of Congress given its codification in 
the ‘33 Act. Thus, Regulation S-X and SOX’s audit reforms would still 
apply to the offering audit. The reason why I am not advocating the 
removal of the offering audit is twofold. First, in the IPO context, the 
public often has very little intelligence about the company going public. 
Second, recent empirical work has shown that the offering audit has not 
been commodified—perhaps because it is a one-time engagement.350 
                                                     
347. Id. 
348. See, e.g., id. at 800–12. 
   349. Carter Statement, supra note 16, at 59–60.   
350. See generally Ramgopal Venkataraman et al., What if Auditing Was Not A ‘Low-Margin 
Business’? Auditors and Their IPO Clients as a Natural Experiment (MIT Sloan, Working Paper 
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Thus the offering audit may still retain its signaling power for 
companies. 
In sum, the first part of the proposal discontinues the mandatory 
statutory audit as a transparency audit,351 on the expectation that a 
shareholder right to a stewardship audit352 will be created under state or 
federal law as described in the second part of the proposal.353 Both 
public and private companies would be encouraged to voluntarily 
undergo a transparency audit as a premium signaling device to the 
market.354 Ideally, these new voluntary transparency audits would 
conform to a set of best practices (e.g., Generally Accepted Auditing 
Standards (GAAS)),355 but such guidelines should not be mandatory. 
Use of best practices rather than mandatory audit performance rules 
would allow for accounting firms themselves to signal their quality to 
the marketplace. To be clear, there are two levels of premium signaling 
to the marketplace in my proposal. First, a voluntary transparency audit 
allows companies to signal their quality to either the public or private 
markets, as appropriate. Second, the development of best practices for 
this transparency audit itself would allow auditors to develop a 
reputation for quality in the market as well as allow companies to choose 
what level of quality signal they want to send (as indicated by their 
choice of auditor and/or audit quality level).356 This would put us back 
                                                     
abstract_id=573443. 
351. Using the term as defined by Hepp and Mayhew—and discussed above—to signify an audit 
done for benefit of third party prospective investors in the public markets (Turnbull refers to these 
as economic oriented, or prospectus, audits). See supra Part I; Hepp & Mayhew, supra note 39, at 
3–4; Turnbull, supra note 36, at 2. 
352. Again, using the term as defined by Hepp and Mayhew—and discussed above—to signify 
an audit done solely or primarily for the benefit of a principal who hires the auditor as his direct 
agent (Turnbull refers to these as governance oriented audits such as the statutory annual audit in 
the U.K.). See supra Part I; Hepp & Mayhew, supra note 39, at 3–4; Turnbull, supra note 36, at 2. 
353. Infra Part III.B.2. 
354. Private companies who have not registered their securities or offerings under either the ‘33 
Act or ‘34 Act would of course have to take care not to appear to be offering securities for sale in 
violation of the ‘33 Act. See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, § 5, 48 Stat. 74 (codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000)). 
355. “Generally accepted audit standards” had been issued by the AICPA, but will now be under 
the control of the PCAOB. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 103, 116 Stat. 
745. 
356. The proposal’s effect on company level signaling comports well with Butler and Ribstein’s 
observations set out in their recent book. See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 73, at 25–30. It could 
also strengthen beneficial competition and quality signaling efforts by stock exchanges and other 
capital markets in that they could require certain kinds and quality of transparency audits in their 
listing requirements, similar to the NYSE position in the 1920s. See supra Part I; BUTLER & 
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on the path of a real reputational marketplace for auditors that was lost 
over seventy years ago. 
2. Giving Shareholders Control of the Audit 
Even as one hand seems to take away in this proposal, the other gives 
back. States would be strongly encouraged to amend their corporations 
laws to give shareholders an explicit right to administer an annual audit 
for the shareholders’ benefit, with costs charged to the company. In the 
alternative, and acknowledging the difficulty of amending the laws of 
fifty states,357 the proposal could accommodate a change in the ‘34 Act 
or SEC regulations thereunder that requires a representative shareholder 
or shareholders, elected directly by the shareholders at large, to manage 
the audit relationship. This would transfer control of the audit 
relationship from the board’s audit committee, where it sits now per 
SOX (as discussed above), to the shareholders themselves. Regardless of 
whether this shareholder audit right is located in state or federal law, it 
would be constructed as a stewardship audit, such that its sole purpose 
would be to inform the existing shareholders as they exercised their 
voting and ownership rights in the company.358 
In my 2004 article, Be Careful What You Wish For: How Accountants 
and Congress Created the Problem of Auditor Independence,359 I 
concluded by suggesting that the U.S. attempt to emulate the British 
system on which it was ostensibly based.360 Thus, this second part of my 
                                                     
RIBSTEIN, supra note 73, at 33–34. On the other hand, Hepp and Mayhew argue that the elimination 
of a mandatory transparency audit might increase transaction costs for information in the 
marketplace. See Hepp & Mayhew, supra note 39, at 12–22. However, the flawed commodified 
statutory audits currently employed as transparency audits must bring their own heightened 
transaction costs which Hepp and Mayhew do not appear to address. Thus, in a world where the 
statutory audit is in fact a reliable, trustworthy certification and/or source of information, Hepp and 
Mayhew would likely be correct that such a device would reduce other information-based 
transaction costs in the marketplace. I am arguing that that world is impossible. 
357. Although arguably not all states’ laws would need to conform to this part of the proposal for 
it to have the desired effect. Adoption by key incorporation states such as Delaware would 
effectively cover a large number of corporations. Further, even as state corporations law is often 
characterized as a race to the bottom as each state tries to attract more corporation charters with 
business friendly provisions, activist and institutional shareholders could theoretically drive this the 
other way by choosing to invest in companies chartered in states with the proposed shareholder 
stewardship audit. Butler and Ribstein make similar observations about shareholder desires and state 
competition for shareholder protections. See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 73, at 30–33. 
358. See supra Part I. 
359. O’Connor, supra note 1. 
360. Id. at 825. 
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proposal must work together with the discontinuation of the statutory 
audit as a transparency audit to instead establish a stewardship audit 
right for shareholders. But I acknowledged in my earlier article that the 
British audit system might not be demonstrably better than the U.S. 
system.361 In fact, commentators in England, Canada, and Australia have 
noted a problem with their respective British shareholder audit based 
systems—while the shareholder audit is still included in statutory 
corporations law in these countries, it has been co-opted such that 
management effectively controls the audit relationship.362 Because this 
paradoxically put shareholders in those countries in a worse position 
with regard to the auditor than U.S. shareholders in the post-SOX system 
(which requires independent audit committee control of the audit 
relationship), jurisdictions such as Canada have moved to an audit 
committee system partly modeled after the U.S. system.363 But, as 
commentators have noted, this still ignores the original strength of the 
British based shareholder stewardship audit right.364 
Accordingly, a number of commentators in those countries are calling 
for a return to a true shareholder stewardship audit right, meaningfully 
controlled by the shareholders.365 One commentator further notes that in 
an era of strong, motivated institutional investors, the collective action 
problem existing in a model based on a view of the shareholder 
population for a given company consisting of hundreds or even 
thousands of small individual shareholders is no longer as 
problematic.366 While large institutional investors may not have the same 
interests as other kinds of investors,367 they could still work as a useful 
coordinating mechanism for other investors and interests, similar to lead 
plaintiffs/counsel for class action law suits.368 In the alternative, my 
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proposal could accommodate, and benefit from, the financial statement 
insurance (FSI) proposals of Professors Cunningham, Ronen, and 
Cherny,369 in that the insurance entities providing FSI could play the 
coordinating role for shareholders instead. Another commentator has in 
fact suggested that FSI could be used to realign auditors’ incentives in 
the agency theoretic framework.370 Because my proposal neither relies 
on, nor requires, implementation of an FSI model, I will not discuss the 
perceived merits and flaws of the model here. 
The second part of my proposal is bolstered by the British, Australian, 
and Canadian commentators as they explain the current deficiencies of 
nominally shareholder stewardship audits in countries that followed the 
original British audit system. These commentators assert that such 
deficiencies are largely attributable to the kind of management and/or 
board committee capture of the audit relationship as happened in the 
United States. Coupled with the apparent satisfaction of venture capital 
and private equity investors in the direct contractual information and 
control systems upon which they condition their investments in portfolio 
companies,371 it is clear that the time for a shareholder stewardship audit 
right has arrived. 
In an alternate, counterfactual world from the one in which we 
actually live, the Roosevelt Administration would have been able to 
shepherd a more complete U.S. version of the Companies Act, 1929 
through Congress.372 However, just because Roosevelt was unable to 
complete his vision of federalizing corporate law, we should not be stuck 
with the historical accident of a discordant corporate/securities laws 
regime separated between the federal and state governments. At the 
same time, debates over federalizing corporate law are extensive and 
will not be restated here. In part, this is because I do not see my proposal 
as necessarily part of the federalization initiative. The shareholder 
stewardship audit right that I am looking for could likely be promulgated 
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372. See supra Part I. 
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by the SEC as part of its power to regulate some of the governance of 
issuers under the ‘34 Act, especially after passage of SOX.373 In the 
alternative, it could be legislated by Congress as an amendment to the 
‘34 Act, even though some commentators argue that Congress may have 
already overstepped its constitutional bounds in partially pre-empting 
state corporate governance laws.374 Thus, my proposal neither relies on 
nor requires a full blown federalization of corporate law. 
My preference is for this shareholder stewardship audit right to be 
added into state corporations law with other shareholder rights. But that 
will only work if the right can be made meaningful and effective in a 
critical mass of states.375 Effective state law shareholder rights are 
themselves the subject of an intense debate that is closely intertwined 
with the debate over “shareholder primacy”—a collection of positions 
arguing for the primacy of shareholders interests over those of other 
stakeholders in a corporation.376 Accordingly, the challenge of amending 
corporations law in a number of states and making sure that such 
amendments are meaningful for shareholders,377 may make 
implementation of the second part of my proposal at the state level 
somewhat unlikely. 
                                                     
373. In fact, some commentators have argued that the full federalization of corporate governance 
by the SEC acting under the federal securities laws is already underway. See, e.g., Roberta S. 
Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas—The Securities and Exchange Commission 
Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79 (2005). 
374. See generally id.; Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, 
REGULATION, Spring 2003. 
375. Not necessarily a majority, but rather at least major incorporation states such as Delaware, 
California, New York, New Jersey, and now, from what I hear anecdotally, Nevada. 
376. For support of increased shareholder rights and some form of shareholder primacy, see, for 
example, Lucian A. Bebchuck, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for 
Law, Econ., and Bus., Discussion Paper No. 548, March 2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=891823; Lucian A. Bebchuck, The Case for Increasing Shareholder 
Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 835 (2005); and Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the 
Shareholder (Notre Dame Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 05-16, 2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=761904. For opposition to shareholder primacy models, see, for 
example, Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003) and Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing 
Shareholder Power (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 
05-16, Aug. 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=783044. For arguments supporting limited 
shareholder voting rights, see, for example, Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited 
Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601 (2006). 
377. For example, the amended laws do not allow recapture of the auditor similar to the 
experience in a number of British audit system countries.  See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 
360–364. 
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In sum, the second part of my proposal essentially takes what was the 
transparency statutory audit (removed under the first part of the 
proposal) and refashions it into a shareholder stewardship audit right. 
This is especially true if the shareholder stewardship audit is 
implemented at the federal legislative or regulatory level because the 
two parts could be done as more or less a single act of legislation or 
rulemaking. Implementation at the federal level also seems to be the 
more plausible path at the moment as well. But making the change at the 
federal level seems to play into constitutional concerns over the 
increasing federalization of corporate governance laws. Thus, a 
conceptually neater, and constitutionally sounder, implementation would 
be at the state level. However, this path has its own challenges due to 
achieving reform in multiple states and some opposition to increased 
shareholder rights and/or primacy. Nonetheless, given the flexibility in 
implementation paths available for the second part of the proposal, I am 
confident that this reform could be achieved as well. 
3. Unifying or Harmonizing the Licensing and Regulation of CPAs 
The final strand of the solution focuses on the hybrid 
federal/state/non-governmental organization regulation and association 
of the accounting profession. Certainly other professions, including the 
legal profession, have operated more or less successfully with bifurcated 
licensing and association functions. But most other professions, 
including the legal profession, have not had the same extent of 
simultaneous multi-party obligations foisted upon their performance of a 
core service line. For example, lawyers are supposed to uphold the legal 
system as officers of the court as they go about their client services, but 
this is not even close to the “public trust” that CPAs are supposed to be 
working on behalf of—even if it means acting against their paying 
client’s interests—when they perform the current statutory audits. At the 
same time, state boards of accountancy have been lax in monitoring 
CPA behavior and imposing appropriate sanctions for misbehavior.378 
Finally, outside of some controversial provisions in SOX itself,379 
lawyers are generally not subjected to the same hybrid state-federal 
system to which accountants are—at least CPAs who wish to perform 
statutory audit work. 
                                                     
378. See McCoy, supra note 370, at 1000–02. 
379. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204,  § 307, 116 Stat. 745. 
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Currently, the discordance of federal-state corporate and securities 
laws exists in an enhanced manner for CPA regulation: not only are 
there separate state and federal systems regulating CPAs, but there are 
also important self-regulatory aspects to the CPA system—such as the 
AICPA—that are not part of federal, state or local governments.380 As 
indicated above, the unified system of licensing and regulating the 
prestigious chartered accountants in the United Kingdom—through the 
royally chartered accounting societies—already existed when the 
drafters of the 1930s U.S. securities laws were copying selective parts of 
the Companies Act, 1929 to create the new U.S. laws.381 But the audit 
provisions of the Companies Acts, 1929 arguably rested in part on the 
very existence of this effective, unitary regulatory mechanism for the 
accountants who would be hired by shareholders to actually perform the 
audit. Combined with the error in not taking the exact Companies Act, 
1929 provision of exclusive shareholder control of auditors, this failure 
on the part of the drafters of the securities laws to consider fully the 
effects of the very different accountant regulatory systems of the two 
countries arguably led to the intractable problems surrounding the issue 
of auditor independence in the United States.382 
Thus, the final part of my proposed solution calls for a unified 
licensing, regulation, and association body for accountants. Such a 
modification could still take place on the state level, and even through 
the existing state boards of accountancy, but the theme would be to 
emulate more fully the British chartered accountant model that still 
seems to command more respect and prestige than any of its U.S. 
counterparts. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The current audit system simply does not work. The root cause of 
why it does not work is the misalignment of incentives in the 
inescapable agency model of auditing. Despite debates over shareholder 
primacy, federalization of corporate law, and even the mandatory 
disclosure system, the protection of shareholder interests must at least be 
on the same level as protection of other stakeholders. Otherwise, we may 
well see a sharp reduction in the availability of investor capital in the 
                                                     
380. O’Connor, supra note 1, at 751–56, 822–24. 
381. Id.  
382. Id. 
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markets. Because the corporate structure is still largely a means to create 
a vehicle to aggregate capital for socially beneficial and desirable 
undertakings, the incentives for such capital aggregation need to be 
protected. 
One of the key protections that must be afforded to those who make 
an investment of capital is a meaningful mechanism to monitor one’s 
investment, not just to wait and hope for a decent, but unexplained, 
return on that investment. Going back to its roots in the British system, 
the single purpose audit can be one of the most powerful tools to 
monitor one’s investments. In fact, private audit rights are often 
negotiated into everything from a venture capital financing to a 
copyright license (to monitor the accrual and payment of royalties). Yet, 
the U.S. audit system took some wrong turns as it developed and, as a 
result, exists currently in a state of confusion and inefficiency. A 
massive bramble bush of independence rules has not helped the system, 
nor prevented—nor perhaps even substantially limited—any of the 
corporate accounting scandals of the past century. Thus it is time to 
reconsider the system from first principles, as advocated by Professor 
Allen in his original work with the ISB. The position of this Article is 
that the players and their interests—especially the accountants—need to 
be realigned along basic, understandable, and enforceable agency 
principles. 
There exist three means to achieve this, each having a different 
combination of the options I presented under each part of my proposal 
above. The first combination is perhaps conceptually neater and, I would 
argue, ideal: federalize corporations law, add a shareholder stewardship 
audit right, remove the statutory audit from federal securities law, and 
unify the licensing, regulation, and association of accountants in one 
national body (endorsed by Congress, but not necessarily a federal 
agency). However, this path seems to present the greatest political and 
constitutional challenges, making it unlikely to be adopted in full. 
The other two combinations are far from perfect, yet they do a decent 
job of remedying the most severe shortcomings of the current system. 
The second combination is a mixed federal-state plan that presents 
challenges because it requires the passage of legislation across multiple 
states. Given that the UCC seems to be the only major model law widely 
adopted across the country, then it would appear that this second 
approach would risk partial adoption across the country. This is not 
necessarily fatal, so long as the primary charter states such as Delaware 
adopt the change. Further, it could be that influential shareholders such 
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as institutional investors push this change once it starts by choosing to 
invest only in companies chartered in states that have adopted the new 
audit right. At the same time, given the state of crisis that the audit 
system is in, and the spiraling costs of corporate compliance with it and 
other aspects of SOX, it would seem that even an uphill battle in state 
legislatures across the country would be better than staying with the 
status quo. 
The third combination focuses exclusively on federal legislation and 
rulemaking. Congress could amend SOX and/or the ‘34 Act to create a 
shareholder stewardship audit right, while either Congress or the SEC 
could concurrently rescind the statutory audit through legislative or 
regulatory action as appropriate. This would avoid the challenge of 
amending state corporations law across the country. But it would leave 
the fairly large number of shareholders of privately held, non-registered 
companies without an audit right. This flaw might be ameliorated by the 
fact that some number of these shareholders (e.g., professional investors 
such as venture capitalists and hedge fund managers) have in fact 
already negotiated the rights they want to control their investment, often 
including some form of express private audit right. For the remaining 
shareholders, we may have to rely on the state corporations law 
protections for minority shareholders, or other mechanisms that tend to 
assist shareholders with relatively illiquid holdings in non-publicly 
traded companies with thin markets for those companies’ securities. 
Any of these combinations would go a long way to getting us out of 
the quagmire of auditor independence in the current audit system. On an 
abstract level, this proposal seeks to strengthen auditor independence—
or at least the auditor integrity and objectivity that we really seek under 
the rubric of “independence”—by effectively reducing the need for it. 
“De-commodifying” the audit under my proposal would re-establish and 
distinguish audits as the control (stewardship) or premium signaling 
(transparency) mechanisms that they were intended to be. The only 
remaining question, then, is whether to try to complete Roosevelt’s 
agenda from seventy years ago or continue our great experiment in 
corporate federalism. 
 
